MIRANDA IN TAIWAN: WHY IT FAILED AND WHY WE
SHOULD CARE

Shih-Chun Steven Chien＊
In 1997, the Taiwanese legislature amended the Code of
Criminal Procedure to incorporate the core of the American
Miranda rule into the legal system. The Miranda rule requires
police officers and prosecutors to notify criminal suspects subject to
custodial interrogation of their right to remain silent and their right
to retain legal counsel. In subsequent amendments, the legislature
enacted a series of laws to further reform interrogation practices in
the same vein.
What happened next is a study in unintended consequences
and the interdependence of law and culture. Using ethnographic
methods and data sources collected over the past four years from 48
police officers and 99 prosecutors in metropolitan Taiwan, this
Article relates a cautionary tale. Under Taiwan’s abbreviated
Miranda system, suspects are encouraged to cooperate and give
statements under the perception that they have been, and will
continue to be, treated with politeness, dignity, and respect. Police
and prosecutors use the Miranda mechanism (providing dignity,
respect, and voice to suspects) to build rapport with suspects and
distract them from the actual consequences of their full cooperation.
Such concerns were implicated at a high level in the indictment of
former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-Jeou in 2018, when
prosecutors publicly denounced Ma for his “bad attitude” in
exercising his right to remain silent during prosecutorial interviews.
＊

Research Social Scientist, American Bar Foundation. For extremely valuable comments
and discussions I thank Ronald J. Allen, Elliot Aronson, John J. Donohue III, John Hagan,
Deborah Hensler, Hsieh Meng-Chao (謝孟釗), Tonja Jacobi, Saul M. Kassin, Joshua
Kleinfeld, Richard A. Leo, Robert J. MacCoun, Lawrence C. Marshall, Jonathan Simon,
Charles D. Weisselberg, and Franklin E. Zimring. I owe special thanks to my mentors—
Lawrence M. Friedman, David A. Sklansky, and Yang Yun-Hua (楊雲驊)—for their
encouragement and guidance from the very beginning of this project. I am forever grateful
for the kindness and wisdom of the late Joan Petersilia. Many thanks to the police officers,
prosecutors, lawyers, media reporters, and advocates in Taiwan for sharing their stories and
offering their friendships. I thank Tsai I-Tung ( 蔡 沂 彤 ) for her excellent research
assistance. For significantly improving the piece, thank you to George D. Wilson, as well
as to the superlative editors at University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

2

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 17

In short, Miranda in Taiwan has become a double-edged
sword: it provides dignified and respectful treatment for suspects
while simultaneously placing heavy extralegal burdens on them to
cooperate with law enforcement agencies. Because Taiwan’s
criminal justice system is a combination of western legal concepts
and traditional Chinese social and cultural notions, Miranda and
related rules have led to ever-greater discrepancies between what is
written in the law books and how police interrogate in practice, and
ever-greater gaps between suspects’ expectations and prosecutorial
realities.
Taiwan is not alone: more than one-hundred jurisdictions
around the world now require warnings similar to the Miranda rule.
It is possible that they suffer similar unintended consequences. I
thus explore the effectiveness of alternative innovations beyond
Miranda that could potentially reduce false confessions and
minimize the risks caused by current interrogation practices.
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INTRODUCTION: THE MIRANDA REVOLUTION
By the 1950s and 1960s the criminal justice community in
the United States had become increasingly dissatisfied with the
nebulous due process voluntariness test. 1 As the general standard
governing the admissibility of confession, the test offered little
guidance to the police and the courts. A commentator later
described the situation as being one where the U.S. Supreme Court
[hereinafter the Court] created a test that made “everything relevant
but nothing determinative.” 2 If the Court was to regulate police
1 See Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 N W. U. L. REV. 71, 75 (2006)
(stating that “because of the ambiguity in what an “involuntary confession” is, and how
one can be identified, the voluntariness test did not suffice to sort out truly voluntary from
involuntary confessions resulting from police interrogation.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869–70 (1981) (stating that the preMiranda test “virtually invited” trial judges to “give weight to their subjective preferences”
and “discouraged active review even by the most conscientious appellate judges”); William
J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 980–81 (2001) (arguing that “the
three decades before Miranda showed that a case-by-case voluntariness inquiry shorted
badly, and at least part of the reason was that courts had a very hard time judging, case by
case, the difference between good and bad police interrogation tactics . . . .By 1966, the
voluntariness standard seemed to be failing, and so could not do the job for which it was
designed . . . .”).
2 Joseph D. Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind, Formalism’s Triumph
Over Substance and Reason, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 243–44 (1986). See also Geoffrey
R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, SUP. CT. REV. 99 (1977) (discussing
issues surrounding the voluntariness test and the Court’s response to it).
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interrogation more effectively, it needed a clean test that did not
require the complicated inquiry into whether the suspect had
confessed voluntarily. It was in such a context that the Court issued
the decision of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 3 In
Miranda, the Court concludes that the coercive atmosphere of
custodial police interrogation compromises the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, and that a level playing field
requires a pre-interview waiver following a statement of a suspect’s
rights and the consequences of submitting to an interview. The
Court thus requires police officers to inform suspects of their rights
to remain silent and to the availability of legal counsel prior to
confession. Statements made by defendants are inadmissible if a
waiver of the rights to silence and counsel was not made
“voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.”4
The U.S. legal community has provided abundant resources
for considering Miranda’s social effects in the decades since the
Miranda decision.5 Some empirical studies show that the Miranda
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also Yale Kamisar, Miranda: The
Case, The Man, and the Players, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1074, 1077 (1984) (suggesting that
Miranda is a compromise between the old totality-of-the-circumstances test and extreme
proposals that threaten to put an end to confession); Saul M. Kassin et al., Police
Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 383 (2007) (remarking that Miranda is “[o]ne of the best known
legal opinion in American history”).
4 Miranda, supra note 3 at 475.
5 Immediately following the decision, legal scholarship began to evaluate the
empirical impact of the Miranda mechanism, including police compliance with the new
Miranda requirement, law enforcement’s attitudes toward Miranda, and the effect of the
Miranda warnings generally. For legal scholarship on Miranda, see generally Lawrence S.
Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DENV. L.J. 1
(1970); Richard J. Medalie, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation’s Capital: The
Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 M ICH. L. REV. 1347 (1968); Richard H. Seeburger & R.
Stanton Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh: A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT L. REV. 1 (1967);
Michael Wald et al., Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J.
1519 (1967); James W. Witt, Non-coercive Interrogation and the Administration of
Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 320 (1973). For a general review of Miranda, see generally LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 301–04 (BasicBooks 1993);
George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: “Embedded”
in Our National Culture, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 232–66 (2002); GEORGE C. THOMAS III &
RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT: FROM TORTURE TO MIRANDA AND BEYOND
(Oxford Univ. Press 2012) [hereinafter THOMAS & LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT]; George C.
Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and Better) Empirical
Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996); Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of
Miranda in the Twenty-first Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000 (2001); Charles D.
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warnings thwart the police and reduce conviction rates. 6 Others
argue that Miranda does not provide meaningful protection for the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 7 Scholars
Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121 (2001)
[hereinafter In the Stationhouse]; Charles D. Weisselberg, Exporting and Importing
Miranda, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1235 (2017) [hereinafter Exporting and Importing]; Kit Kinports,
Pretrial Custody and Miranda, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 725 (2021).
6 For example, Paul Cassell argued that the conviction and confession rates have
dropped significantly as the direct effect of the Miranda decision. For some of Paul
Cassell’s scholarship criticizing Miranda, see generally Paul G. Cassell, Alternatives to the
Miranda Warnings: The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in Dickerson, 99
MICH. L. REV. 898 (2001); PAUL G. CASSELL, NAT’L. CTR. POL’Y. ANALYSIS, HANDCUFFING
THE COPS: MIRANDA’S HARMFUL EFFECTS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, NO. 218 (1998); Paul G.
Cassell, Miranda’s Negligible Effect on Law Enforcement: Some Skeptical Observations,
20 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 327 (1997); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An
Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387 (1996); Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No
Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s Defenders, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1084 (1995); Paul G.
Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops: A Review of Fifty Years of
Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REV.
685 (2017). In another article, Cassell attacked the Miranda decision on the grounds that it
harms innocent suspects. According to Cassell, Miranda harms the innocent because it
inhibits police from gaining confessions from truly guilty suspects that would therefore
exonerate innocents who have been wrongfully convicted. See Paul Cassell, Protecting the
Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions—And from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998) (arguing that Miranda does not protect the innocent). But see
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth
Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 M ICH. L. REV. 941 (2001) (criticizing Cassell’s position
and stating that the “lost-convictions issue is . . . a nonexistent problem”); Tonja Jacobi,
Miranda 2.0, 50 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1, 16 (2016) (discussing an ABA study that shows law
enforcement and prosecutors do not think Miranda significantly impede their work). For
other criticisms of Miranda, see generally Allen, supra note 1; Susan R. Klein,
Transparency and Truth during Custodial Interrogations and Beyond, 97 B.U. L. REV. 993,
1004–24 (2017); Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 5; William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s
Irrelevance: Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975 (2001); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 222–24, 234 (Harvard Univ. Press 2011);
George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation
Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1094–106 (2003) (“Instead, I will argue that Miranda’s great
protections were illusory from the very beginning, even if later Courts had tried to follow
its spirit scrupulously.”); George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-Word Failure? A Plea
for More (and Better) Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821, 831–37 (1996) (“If these
conjectures can be experimentally confirmed, it would suggest that Miranda permits police
to control the interrogation process roughly the way they did in the pre-Miranda days.”).
7 See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Richard A. Leo, The Miranda App:
Metaphor and Machine, 97 B.U. L. REV. 935, 940–48 (2017) (arguing that Miranda has
been ineffective in protecting rights); Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk
Factors and Recommendations, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010) (analyzing Miranda
waivers and their relation to police-induced confessions); RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE
INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press 2008) (detailing the police
interrogation process, including Miranda, and its impact on the American justice system)
[hereinafter LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION]; Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda
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often explain Miranda’s failure through three perspectives: first,
police appear to have successfully adapted to the Miranda
requirements and developed strategies that are intended to induce
Miranda waivers. 8 Studies consistently report that, in some
jurisdictions, police are systematically trained to violate Miranda by
continuing to question suspects who have invoked the right to
counsel or the right to remain silent. 9 Second, the Court has
retreated from its original construction of the Miranda protection
and has weakened its safeguards. 10 Finally, scholars have also
pointed out that creating a one-size-fits-all protection simply cannot
ensure that suspects will be “empowered to choose between speech
and silence during a pressure-filled interrogation.”11
Despite the disagreement and uncertainty in the past decades
of Miranda impact studies,12 there is little dispute that police appear
Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1996) (advocating for mandatory
videotaping of custodial interrogations) [hereinafter Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisted].
8
See, e.g., LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 405 (Athenium, 1st
ed.1983); Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators’
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397 (1999);
THOMAS & LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT, supra note 5; Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning
Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519 (2008).
9 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Miranda’s Fourfold Failure, 97 B.U. L. REV. 849,
850–63 (2017) (explaining that Miranda does not protect against deceptive interrogations);
Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 153–62 (1998)
(analyzing whether Miranda should be reexamined to further its vision).
10 LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 7, at 279–80; MARY L. PITMAN &
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE MIRANDA RULING: ITS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 117–
38 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010); Weisselberg, supra note 9.
11 Weisselberg, Exporting and Importing, supra note 5, at 1236. See also Morgan
Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally
Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 535, 538 (2002); Virginia G. Cooper & Patricia
A. Zapf, Psychiatric Patients’ Comprehension of Miranda Rights, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
390, 390 (2008).
12 Since the mid-1990s, there has been a second wave of the Miranda impact debate.
Unlike the earlier studies conducted in the late 1960s, these studies focus largely on the
quantitative impact of Miranda on confession, clearance, and conviction rates. For studies
focused on the quantitative impacts of Miranda, see generally Paul G. Cassell & Richard
Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects
on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998); Paul G. Cassell & Brett S. Hayman,
Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 839 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial
Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Cost, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500 (1996). However, when
conducting comprehensive empirical analyses of the Miranda effect, it is critical to be
aware of the fact that differences in the data samples and in the ideological viewpoints of
the studies may lead to extensively different conclusions about just how much Miranda has
affected confession and conviction rates. As John Donohue points out, it is extremely
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to issue and document Miranda warnings in virtually all cases. 13 It
is perhaps not surprising that, in Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428 (2000), the Court made an empirical claim that “Miranda
has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where
the warnings have become part of our national culture.” 14
Meanwhile, a significant number of nations have implemented or
are implementing Miranda-like mechanisms, with warnings about
the right to remain silent and the right to retain counsel prior to
police questioning. 15 The U.S. Library of Congress has reported
that warnings similar to the U.S. Miranda mechanism are required
in more than a hundred jurisdictions around the world.16 Taiwan is
one of those places that implements Miranda-like protections. This
Article examines the practices of police interrogation and the
phenomenon of false confession within Taiwan’s criminal justice
system. It aims to offer an empirical evaluation regarding police
interrogation in Taiwan and provide critical analysis regarding the
future development of the Miranda system. I argue that the failure
of Miranda in Taiwan actually points the way to possible solutions
of the Miranda dilemma in the United States and other jurisdictions
where at least some Miranda mechanisms are in place. I argue that
we ought to recognize the limited function of Miranda in curbing
police interrogation practices and move onto a holistic approach to
difficult to find any direct effect of a legal intervention since “the complex forces that
shape major social phenomena do not tend to shift dramatically or quickly in response to a
legal intervention.” See John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness,
50 STAN L. REV. 1147, 1149 (1997). For reviews and criticisms of the “Miranda impact
studies,” see generally Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility:
A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1988); Richard A. Leo & Richard
J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557 (1998); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reply: Miranda and
Clearance Rates, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 278 (1996); George C. Thomas III., Plain Talk about
the Miranda Empirical Debate: A Steady-State Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV.
933 (1996). Given the methodological problems, confounded with other explanatory
variables, and questionable crime data, empirical studies during the late 1990s leave us
with only uncertainty about these statistical results.
13
Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266,
266–303 (1996); LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 7, at 123–64; George C. Thomas
III, Stories about Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1997-2000 (2004). See also
Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 1547–62 (suggesting that officers routinely use pre-Miranda
conversation to build rapport in order to obtain a waiver).
14 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000).
15 Weisselberg, Exporting and Importing, supra note 5, at 1251.
16 LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., GLOB. LEGAL RESEARCH. CTR., MIRANDA WARNING
EQUIVALENTS ABROAD 1 (2016).
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bring about better transparency and accountability as to police
activities.
The first half of this Article provides an overview of
Taiwan’s modern interrogation rule and practices, focusing on how
Taiwanese law enforcement officers explain and apply the new rule.
Modern Taiwan’s criminal justice system is a combination of
western legal concepts and traditional Chinese social and cultural
notions. 17 Such a combination is more likely to lead to
discrepancies between what is written in the law books and how
police actually interrogate in practice. In the field of police
interrogation, one of the major modern Taiwanese legal reforms was
the three-step adoption of the Miranda rules. This Article focuses
on the implementation of the Taiwanese Miranda system and how
police in Taiwan systematically create backstage/front-stage
interrogation practices to circumvent external oversight. I argue
that the Miranda rule—together with other procedural mandates that
seek to eliminate police discretionary power during interrogation—
have caused police activities in some respects to go underground,
where the police can tailor the criminal justice system to meet a
myriad variety of goals and interests. The second half of the Article
turns to the issue of false confessions. Until now, there have been
many documented wrongful conviction cases in Taiwan.18 However,
none of the existing social and legal studies have examined whether
and how the structure and practices of police interrogation may
contribute to the problem of false confessions. This Article
empirically investigates practices in Taiwanese police interrogation
and their impact on false confessions. I further evaluate the
effectiveness of alternative innovations beyond the Miranda
mechanism, which could be implemented to manage low-visibility
police activities, identify false confessions, and minimize the
damage arguably caused at times by current practices.

17
See generally WANG TAI-SHENG (王泰升), TAIWAN FALU XIANDAIHUA LICHENG:
CONG NEIDI YANCHANG DAO ZIZHU JISHOU (台灣法律現代化歷程:從”內地延長”到”自主
繼受”) [THE PROCESS OF LEGAL MODERNIZATION IN TAIWAN: FROM THE EXTENSION OF
MAINLAND TO INDEPENDENT RECEPTION] (2015) (discussing the evolution of modern
Taiwan’s criminal justice system).
18 See generally TAIWAN YUANYU PINGFAN XIEHUI (台灣冤獄平反協會) [TAIWAN
INNOCENCE PROJECT], http://twinnocenceproject.org/index.php [https://perma.cc/CN7JYPXV] (last visited Sept. 20, 2021) (providing information on cases, exonerations, and
latest news in Taiwan).
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TAIWAN’S MODERN INTERROGATION RULE: THE
THREE-STEP ADOPTION OF THE MIRANDA

In 1967, the government initiated the first reform of the
Code of Criminal Procedure since 1949, when the Chinese
Nationalist Party ( 國 民 黨 ) lost the Civil War and retreated to
Taiwan. 19 However, the basic inquisitorial structure and the
reliance on confession remained intact. Between 1968 and 1982,
the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan’s congress) did not pass any
amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure. 20 Since 1996, as a
relatively new democracy, Taiwan has begun to reform its criminal
justice system in order to replace authoritarian rule with a system
committed to human rights protection. 21 Taiwan’s legislative and
judicial branches have played crucial roles in facilitating Taiwan’s
legal reform regarding criminal justice. 22 The Legislative Yuan has
amended the Code of Criminal Procedure at least once a year
between 1997 and 2004.23
19 ZHU SHIYAN (朱石炎), XINGSHI SUSONG FALUN
ON THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] 4–5 (2020).
20

(刑事訴訟法論) [COMMENTARY

See Tom Ginsburg, The Warren Court in East Asia: An Essay in Comparative Law,
in EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT 265, 283–86 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2007)
(explaining that Taiwan’s criminal procedure was underdeveloped under authoritarian rule).
21 See LIN YU-HSIUNG (林 鈺雄), XINGSHI S USONG F A (刑事訴訟 法) [CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE LAW] PART I 7–13 (7th ed. 2013); Zhang Li-Qing (張麗卿), Xingshi Susong Fa
Bainian Huigu yu QianZhan ( 刑 事 訴 訟 法百 年 回 顧與 前 瞻 ) [Overview of the Past
Hundred Years of Criminal Justice Reform], 75 YUEDAN FAXUE ZAZHI (月旦法學雜誌)
[TAIWAN L. REV.] 40, 40–59 (2001) (examining Taiwan’s criminal justice reform). The
Taiwanese experience of democracy is unique in its practices and structures. Although
theories and practices of democracy in other countries have led to significant changes in
Taiwan’s political landscape, Taiwanese democracy continues to show its special character.
See generally Anya Bernstein, Why Taiwan is too Democratic: Legitimation,
Administration, and Political Participation in Taipei (June 2007) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Chicago) (exploring the values and ideals that underlie Taiwan’s
democracy); PHILIP PAOLINO & JAMES MEERNIK, DEMOCRATIZATION IN TAIWAN:
CHALLENGES IN TRANSFORMATION (Ashgate Publ’g Co. 2008); LEE TENG-HUI, THE ROAD
TO DEMOCRACY: TAIWAN’S PURSUIT OF IDENTITY (1999). See also TOM GINSBURG,
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 108
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003) (suggesting that one of the distinctive elements of Taiwan’s
experience is its “gradual and extended democratic transition”).
22 For an overview of Taiwan’s modern legal reform, see Tang Te-Chung (湯德宗) &
Huang Kuo-Chang (黃國昌), SIFA GAIGE SHI ZHOUNIAN DE HUIGU YU ZHANWANG HUIYI
SHILU ( 司 法 改 革 十 週 年 的 回 顧 與 展 望 會 議 實 錄 ) [THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL REFORM] (2010).
23 See Legislative History, LAW & REGULATIONS DATABASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
CHINA,
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawHistory.aspx?PCode=C0010001
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Police in Taiwan played a critical role in the transition from
an authoritarian regime to a democracy. The primary issue for
Taiwan’s policy makers was how to transform police from their
formerly authoritarian incarnation to a form acceptable in a
democratic system. In 1997, the Legislative Yuan passed an
amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure that essentially
incorporated the Miranda rule into the legal system. 24 Article 95
requires prosecutors and police to inform suspects of their rights to
silence and legal counsel, and to elicit knowing and voluntary
waivers from suspects before commencing interrogation. 25
According to legislative documents, Taiwan’s legislators modeled
the new amendment on the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment
and the Court’s Miranda decision. 26 The Taiwanese legislative
record described the previous practices of interrogation in Taiwan as
“manipulative,” “oppressive,” and threatening to the rational
decision-making capacity of suspects ignorant of their rights. 27 The
Miranda warnings, according to the legislature, would reduce the
temptation of police officers to abuse their power in the
interrogation room.28
As part of the Miranda-series legislation, in 2003 the
Legislative Yuan enacted Article 158-2, which states that any
confession obtained from a suspect in violation of Article 95 shall
not be admitted as evidence. 29 The amendment included an
[https://perma.cc/F6BQ-FU6K] (last visited Sept. 20, 2021) (listing the legislative history
of the Code of Criminal Procedure). For the impact of criminal justice reforms on
prosecutors’ role, see MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, KUA SHIDAI DE ZHENGYI (跨時代的正義)
[JUSTICE IN THE NEW ERA] (2008).
24 See LI FA YUAN GONG BAO (立法院公報) [THE LEGISLATIVE Y UAN G AZETTE], Vol.
86, No. 44, at 147–48 (amending the law to include rules similar to those in Miranda); LI
FA YUAN GONG BAO (立法院公報) [THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE], Vol. 86, No. 52, at
65, 84, 189, 192 (1997) (stating that the revised Article 95 is based on the Court’s Miranda
decision). However, the revision did not include penalties if law enforcement officials
neglected to inform the suspects of their right to remain silent.
25 Code of Criminal Procedure, § 9, Art. 95 (1997) (Taiwan).
26 Id.
27
LI FA YUAN GONG BAO (立法院公報) [THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE], Vol. 86,
No. 52, at 192, 195–96, 198 (1997). See also LI FA YUAN GONG BAO (立法院公報) [THE
LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE], Vol. 86, No. 44, at 148 (1997) (describing a suspect under
interrogation as a lab rat being teased by police). One of the lawmakers supporting the bill
even shared his personal experience of being tortured by the police, see LI FA YUAN GONG
BAO (立法院公報) [THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE], Vol. 86, No. 52, at 195 (1997).
28 Id.
29 Code of Criminal Procedure, § 12, Art. 158-2 (2003). See also Brian L. Kennedy,
Walking the Fine Line in Taiwan’s New Criminal Code, 10 AM. J. CHINESE STUD. 111,
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exclusionary rule, applicable at the discretion of the trial judge, that
was drawn directly from the Court’s influence. 30 Also, the burden
of proof for demonstrating that the confession had been voluntary
was placed on the prosecution. In 2013, the Legislative Yuan
further amended Article 95, Section 2. It now states that if the
accused asserts the right to counsel, the interrogation must cease
unless the suspect initiates further communication.
Besides the three-step adoption of the Miranda rule, the
Legislative Yuan also amended other interrogation rules, including:
the requirement to record the whole interrogation without
interruption in audio, and if necessary, in video (Article 100-1,
amended in 1997); the forbidding of interrogation from 11 p.m. to 8
a.m. (Article 93, Section 5, amended in 2009); allowing defense
attorneys to interview and correspond with a suspect under arrest or
detention before interrogation (Article 34, Section 2, amended in
2010); and the extension of court-appointed counsel in pretrial
investigation if the suspect is unable to make a complete statement,
or is Taiwanese aborigine (Article 31, amended in 2006 and 2013).
Prior to the adoption of the Miranda rule in 1997, empirical
research in Taiwan directed attention to the immediate effects of
certain interrogation techniques on the suspect’s rights to remain
silent and obtain counsel. 31 After 1997, the new legislation was
widely discussed by law enforcement officers, prosecutors,
professors, and the media. Commentators complained that the new
rules would diminish police and prosecutors’ investigative
effectiveness and coddle criminals. 32 Law professors compared
114–15 (2003) (pointing out that the right to counsel during interrogation in Taiwan is a
“rich man’s right”).
30 LI FA YUAN GONG BAO (立法院公報) [THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE], Vol. 92,
No. 8, at 1831–32 (2003).
31 See Tsai Tun-Ming (蔡敦銘) & Wang Jaw-Perng (王兆鵬), Jianmo Quan de
Shizhen Yanjiu (緘默權的實證研究) [The Empirical Studies of the Right to Remain Silent],
26 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L.J. 79, 79-116 (1996) (discussing techniques such as coercion,
deception, the exchange of legal/illegal privilege, and the good cop/bad cop strategy).
32 For comments from Taiwanese prosecutors regarding criminal justice reforms, see
generally TSAI Pi-Yu (蔡碧玉), JIANCHA SHOUJI: NI SUO BUZHIDAO DE JIANCHAGUAN (檢察
手記：你所不知道的檢察官) [A PROSECUTOR’S PRIVATE NOTES: WHAT YOU DON’T
KNOW ABOUT PROSECUTORS] (2013); CHEN RUI-REN (陳瑞仁), ZHIFA SUOSI (執法所思)
[LAW & ORDER, JUDICIAL REFORM] (2014); JIANCHAGUAN GAIGE XIEHUI (檢察官改革協會)
[PROSECUTORS REFORM ASSOCIATION], ZHENGYI ZHI JIAN: JIANGAIHUI SHIZHOUNIAN JINIAN
ZHUANJI (正義之劍：檢改會十週年紀念專輯) [10TH ANNIVERSARY OF PROSECUTORS
REFORM ASSOCIATION ARCHIVES] (2008).
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Taiwan’s new Miranda rules with similar regulations in Germany,
the United Kingdom, and the decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights.33 Other studies commented on the judicial decisions
and the relevant legal principles. 34 Some even traced the origin of
Taiwan’s Miranda rulings to the United States and discussed its
function within the U.S. context. 35 However, the research focused
almost entirely on the doctrinal issues and ethical dimensions of the
new rules rather than on police trainings and criminal justice
officials’ routine practices. The previous research is missing a
comprehensive analysis of the Miranda rules’ actual effects on
police interrogation practices. The lack of an empirical assessment
in this field has exacerbated the gap between “law in theory” and
“law in practice.”36

II.

THE CURRENT INTERROGATION PRACTICES IN
TAIWAN

To capture the variability among law enforcement agencies,
my analysis is based largely on the type of data most Taiwan’s
33

For scholarly publications comparing Taiwan’s Miranda rules with similar
regulations in European jurisdictions, see, e.g., Huang Han-Yi (黃翰義), Cong Bijiaofa zhi
Guandian Lun Woguo Xingshi Susongfa Shang Weifa Daibu zhi Yansheng Zhengju yu
Quanli Gaozhi Yiwu zhi Guanxi (從比較法之觀點論我國刑事訴訟法上違法逮捕之衍生
證據與權利告知義務之關係) [The Violation of Miranda Warnings: A Comparative Law
Perspective], 52 JUNFA ZHUANKAN (軍法專刊) [MILITARY L.J.] 1 (2006); Lin Yu-Hsiung
(林鈺雄), Oushi Milanda ( 歐式米蘭達 ) [The European Model of Miranda Rule], 72
YUEDAN FAXUE ZAZHI (月旦法學雜誌) [TAIWAN L.J.] 119 (2005); Wang Shih-Fan (王士
帆), Weifan Jianmoquan Gaozhi Yiwu zhi Zhengju Jinzhi (違反緘默權告知義務之證據禁
止) [Exclusion of Evidence in Violation of Warning: Right to Silence: A Comparative View
of German Law], 120 ZHNEGDA FAXUE PINGLUN (政大法學評論) [CHENGCHI L. REV.] 159
(2011).
34 See, e.g., He Lai-Jier (何賴傑), Gongneng Xunwen yu Quanli Gaozhi Yiwu (功能訊
問與權利告知義務) [Functional Interrogation and the Warning of Rights], 179 TAIWAN
FAXUE ZAZHI (台灣法學雜誌) [TAIWAN L.J.] 63 (2011) (comparing the interrogation in a
Taiwan case with a German one); Wang Jaw-Perng (王兆鵬), Kaichuang Zibai Fali de
Xinjiyuan ( 開 創 自 白 法 理 的 新 紀 元 ) [The Development of a New Generation of
Confession Rules], 154 YUEDAN FAXUE ZAZHI (月旦法學雜誌) [T AIWAN L. REV.] 153
(2008) (stating that the judiciary authorities should take actions to increase people’s
confidence in judicial process).
35 See, e.g., Wang Jaw-Perng (王兆鵬), Zibai yu Dushu Guoshi Yuanze (自白與毒樹
果實原則) [Confession and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree], 101 YUEDAN FAXUE ZAZHI
(月旦法學雜誌) [TAIWAN L. J.] 99 (2003) (discussing the fruit of the poisonous tree legal
doctrine in the U.S. cases).
36 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, IMPACT: HOW LAW AFFECTS BEHAVIOR 129 (2016)
(suggesting that the impact of Miranda rule is difficult to measure).
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scholars have neglected: interviews with police officers, defense
lawyers, officers in training divisions of police departments, and
instructors at the Central Police University and Taiwan Police
College; police training materials; interrogation transcripts,
videotapes and police reports; and resources related to the legal
aspects of interrogation and Miranda warnings.37
Between December 2014 and December 2019, I
documented—through hundreds of interviews and meetings with
prosecutors, 38 former prosecutors, 39 police officers, 40 defense
attorneys,41 officials from the Ministry of Justice (法務部),42 media
reporters, 43 and reform advocates 44 —the daily operation of the
criminal justice system in Taiwan. 45 Up until December 2019, I
conducted a total of seventy-five semi-structured interviews with
police personnel in the Criminal Investigative Division of City
Police Department (市刑大), Local Police Stations (派出所), and
Police Precincts ( 分 局 ). 46 I also attended the defense training
37

This study uses empirical research methods to examine how professional legal
actors in Taiwan understand and apply the Miranda rule. Specifically, I focus on
evaluating how police and lawyers’ attitudes, behaviors, and professional/cultural norms
impact the Miranda system. The data collected for this research is not intended, however,
to be representative of every law enforcement agency in Taiwan.
38 N=99.
39 N=12.
40 N=48.
41 N=39.
42 N=18.
43 N=10.
44 N=12.
45 See MARTYN HAMMERSLEY, READING ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH: A CRITICAL
GUIDE (1991) (introducing the nature of ethnographic research and providing criteria by
which ethnographic studies should be evaluated); Harold E. Pepinsky, A Sociologist on
Police Patrol, in FIELDWORK EXPERIENCE: QUALITATIVE APPROACHES TO SOCIAL
RESEARCH 223 (William B. Shaffir et al., eds., 1980) (reflecting on the process of
conducting fieldwork in police station).
46 Interviews ranged in duration from 40 to 150 minutes, and were conducted in
Mandarin Chinese, Taiwanese, or both languages, according to interviewee’s preferences
[hereinafter Interview]. Detailed notes were taken at each interview, and interviews were
tape-recorded if allowed by the interviewees. I digitally recorded and transcribed
interviews but did not translate the transcriptions because I wanted to preserve participants’
language, which was often contained terminology specific to the police subculture.
Throughout this Article, the interviewees’ points of view are illustrated by quotation and
analysis. The quotations serve as a bridge between a general thematic category and specific
experiences. In this way the quotations serve to facilitate the relationship between
interviewees’ experiences and general categories or concepts. Fieldnotes were used to
document contextual information and my reflections about the Taiwanese criminal justice
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section organized by the local Bar Association. 47 I requested and
took part in ride-along with police officers in local police stations
and also participated in three routine traffic stops, one dispatch shift,
and one search of a residence following a street stop. 48
system and police interrogation practices [hereinafter Fieldnote]. Initial fieldnotes, which
contain detailed information about individuals I met and activities I observed, were written
every day after my visit to police departments or interviews with police officers. The
majority of my initial fieldnotes were handwritten. Due to the sensitivity of the subject and
confidentiality, the name of the interviewee and details of each interview is not disclosed.
47 Although the present piece relates the story of how Miranda legislation has
changed interrogation practices in Taiwan, I focus only on the specific interrogation
practices in “Taian City”—a fictitious name of a Taiwanese metropolitan area. There are
two reasons for this: first, Taian City Police Department is one of the largest municipal law
enforcement departments in Taiwan; second, by focusing the scope of this research in
Taian City, I am able to draw stronger empirical conclusions. For general review of
sampling method in qualitative study, see generally JOHN W. CRESWELL, RESEARCH DESIGN:
QUALITATIVE, QUANTITATIVE, AND MIXED METHODS APPROACHES xix (2009) (advancing “a
framework, a process, and compositional approaches for designing a proposal for
qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods research in the human and social sciences”);
Mario Luis Small, How Many Cases Do I Need? On Science and the Logic of Case
Selection in Field-Based Research, 10 ETHNOGRAPHY 5 (2009) (assessing the incorporation
of quantitative methods into qualitative ethnographic case studies); Oisin Tansey, Process
Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling, 40 POL. SCI. & POL.
765 (2007) (exploring the relationship between process tracing and the data collection
technique of elite interviewing); Jan E. Trost, Statistically Nonrepresentative Stratified
Sampling: A Sampling Technique for Qualitative Studies, 9 QUALITATIVE SOCIO. 54 (1986)
(introducing a technique which is a kind of statistically non representative stratified
sampling for qualitative studies).
48 During the data analysis process, I first created an initial coding scheme based on
the major themes and concepts I discovered in my research. Next, I coded transcripts by
questions and developed a descriptive coding scheme based on the specific questions and
the interview protocols’ domains. Then I read several cross-sections of my interviews.
Based on this rereading I revised the coding scheme to include concepts and categories that
had newly emerged. Each interview was read as many times as necessary to ensure that
interviewees’ answers were understood in the most complete manner possible. Cross-case
analysis of the content was performed. This analysis led to core themes being identified
and compared as well as to the derivation of analytical categories. Later I identified pattern
codes that allowed me to index data that illustrated emergent themes. I continued applying
codes and memos to transcripts. When new codes emerged, I updated the coding scheme
and reread all transcripts according to the new structure. I used a systematic line-by-line
coding system to discover any other emerging themes and significant issues. Finally, I
recoded each transcript for the additional themes and issues. Throughout the data analysis,
the interviews and observations were closely examined by the author to evaluate the
necessity of including new interviews and/or continuing the search for different data until
no new information was being added either because of redundancy or a point of theoretical
saturation. A theme was considered to be saturated if at least half the interviewees
supported the author’s analysis. The theme saturation process helped address the internal
validity of the findings. For interviews, I assigned a code to each of my interviewees
(Interview 01 to Interview 204). Individuals who were interviewed several times will be
assigned different numbers. The last two digits are page numbers from the documents. I

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol17/iss1/2

2022]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.
A.

15

Police Behaviors On and Off Camera

While the analysis of official interrogation records remains
of interest, it is improper to assume that these records provide a full
account of police interrogation practices. 49 The videotapes are
records of “formal” interrogations. They provide no insight into
cases in which police resort to interrogation off camera. During this
project, I tracked the behavior of officers both on and off camera
and examined the implications of their behavioral changes to the
original vision of the Miranda warning mechanism.
When police actions were undertaken, legal considerations
were no doubt a major concern. But they were only one potential
factor determining officers’ conduct in a given situation.
Understanding how officers chose to act requires knowing how
police activities operate within the larger arrangement of social
relationships. 50 However, a high percentage of police-citizen

later generated a codebook that contains twenty main topics and about eighty sub-topics.
Finally, I used the codebook to arrange my fieldnotes into forty-two documents (Fieldnote
01 to Fieldnote 42). The last two digits are page numbers from the documents.
49 Researchers of Taiwan’s democratic transition and police reform have examined
the development of policing in Taiwan from a historical, political, and anthropological
perspective. These studies demonstrate the operational logic of police work in Taiwan and
provide cultural explanations for the exemplary smoothness of Taiwan’s democratic
transformation. See LIQUN CAO ET AL., POLICING IN TAIWAN: FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO
DEMOCRACY (2014) (examining the development of policing in Taiwan from various
perspectives and considering the role of the police in the democratic transition); Jeffrey T.
Martin, Legitimate Force in a Particularistic Democracy: Street Police and Outlaw
Legislators in the Republic of China on Taiwan, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 615 (2013)
(exploring a “particularistic” concept of legitimacy important to Taiwanese democracy);
Jeffrey T. Martin, How Law Matters to the Taiwanese Police, 53 ANTHROPOLOGY NEWS 10
(2012) (illustrating a cultural approach to understand the relationship between Taiwanese
policing and the law); Sang Wei-Ming (桑維明) & Chang Kuang-Ming (章光明), Taiwan
Bainian Jingzheng Fangan zhi Huigu yu Zhanwang (臺灣百年警政方案之回顧與展望)
[The Exploration and Prospect on Taiwan Police Policy for Hundred Years], 44 JINGXUE
CONGKAN (警學叢刊) [POLICE SCI. Q.] 1 (2014) (reviewing the history of the changes of
Taiwanese police policy).
50
For a classic empirical study of the everyday activities of Japanese police detectives,
see SETSUO MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN 1–9 (Frank G. Bennet, Jr, & John O. Haley
trans., State Univ. of N.Y. Press 1992) (arguing that the law grants police enormous power
to acquire and control the information needed to perform their central tasks, and these legal
rules give police an unparalleled capacity to “make crimes” and enable them to produce
high clearance rates). See also DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE:
PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 35, 215 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (showing the difficulties
to create or reform the law in Japan due to the norm of unanimity, and that scholars
disagree on what a high conviction rate and a low acquittal rate in Japan mean); Patricia G.
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interaction occurs when it is beyond the view of official scrutiny.
Under the current law, it is required that interrogation be recorded. 51
However, in practice, this legal mandate does not include preinterrogation interactions. It is up to each local police department to
decide whether or not to record those proceedings. Even with the
growing use of body-worn cameras, the vast majority of police
activities remain undocumented and thus unseen by the public.
Moreover, when a police officer carries a body-worn camera, the
record will not become an official document unless the officer
decides to provide the record. It is not legally required to submit
these records to prosecutors or defense lawyers. Therefore, the offcamera behaviors of police officers remain a black box. The current
practice of videotaping does not seem to provide satisfying answers
to concerns surrounding police interrogation. Without taking into
account these backstage police activities, we simply cannot properly
understand the social-legal structure within which the modern
interrogation rules operate. 52
Steinhoff, Pursuing the Japanese Police, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 827 (1993) (providing an
overview of a growing literature on the Japanese police).
51 Code of Criminal Procedure, § 9, Art. 100-1 (1997) (Taiwan).
52 Although the requirement of video recording of police interrogation has commonly
been seen as the solution to concerns over interrogation, the current practices in Taiwan
clearly expose its limitations. See, e.g., JAMES R. ACKER & ALLISON D. REDLICH,
WRONGFUL CONVICTION 201–04 (2011) (pointing out that “proponents of electronic
recording consider the procedure as a win-win situation, one that facilitates convicting the
guilty and freeing the innocent”); Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An
Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 304–07 (2006)
(supporting the mandatory recordings of all interrogation despite some burdens); BRANDON
L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 43–44 (2011) (arguing that “what goes on in the
interrogation room should not remain undocumented, unregulated, unreviewed” and
“[r]ecording can bring interrogation practices into the sunlight”); Jacobi, supra note 6, at
47 (suggesting that “requiring audiovisual recording of all interrogations would not only
help establish actual coercion in some cases, it would reinforce Miranda’s “civilizing”
effect on police behavior.”); Amy Klobuchar, Eye on Interrogations: How Videotaping
Services the Cause of Justice, WASH. POST, June 10, 2002, at A21 (arguing that
“[v]ideotaping . . . leads to real improvements in police interrogation practices that protect
the rights of suspects”); LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 7, at 302–03 (stating that
“electronic recording professionalizes the interrogation function by opening it up to greater
external review . . . by removing secrecy from interrogations, recording should increase
public perceptions of the legitimacy of the criminal justice system more generally”);
Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309, 314–21 (2003) (arguing
that taping is required by constitutional provisions); THOMAS & LEO, CONFESSIONS OF
GUILT, supra note 5, at 220–21 (suggesting that “[p]erhaps one hundred other writers are
on record recommending some form of recording.”). But see Lawrence Rosenthal, Against
Orthodoxy: Miranda Is Not Prophylactic and the Constitution Is Not Perfect, 10 CHAP. L.
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The Pre-Interrogation Police-Suspect Interactions
The Distinction Between Interview and Interrogation

Police interrogation raises complex legal, normative, and
policy questions about justice administration and the relationship
between the individual and the government. However, the criminal
justice system begins to operate even before interrogation, starting
with the preliminary police-suspect encounter when police,
witnessing or responding to a reported crime, detain a person and
bring him or her to the police station. 53
All of my interviewees mention a widely used preliminary
interview tactic. The terms “Fantan” ( 泛談 ) [Interview] 54 and
“Xunwen” (訊問) [Interrogation] refer to different police activities
in Taiwan. Too often these terms are used interchangeably as
though they refer to the same process. In fact, there are significant
distinctions between the two. An interview is an informal process
conducted before interrogation. Some of my interviewees mention
that by maintaining a non-accusatory tone, the investigator is able to
establish a much better rapport with the suspect. They hope that this
REV. 579, 607 (2007) (stating that “we cannot expect videotaping to curb what are already
deemed abuses under current law . . . .”).
53 As this Article shows, the structural differences between the U.S. adversarial
conception of criminal procedure and Taiwan’s long-held inquisitorial conception of
criminal procedure may be so deeply ensconced as to make it impractical to expect that
individual reforms inspired by U.S. models are capable of somehow transforming an
inquisitorial criminal system into a truly adversarial one. See generally Máximo Langer,
From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and
the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004)
(demonstrating that countries with inquisitorial system will not be Americanized by
introducing American-style plea bargaining); Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed:
Intellectual Leadership in Western Law, 42 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 195 (1994) (examining legal
transplants from the civil law to the common law); Wolfgang Wiegand, Americanization of
Law: Reception or Convergence?, in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 137
(Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1996) (concluding that “a reception of
American law has indeed taken place”).
54 In the following paragraphs, I will use “interview” and “Fantan” interchangeably.
Judges in Taiwan have recognized the routine practices of Fantan. See, e.g., Taiwan
Gaodeng Fayuan (台灣高等法院) [Taiwan High Court], Xingshi 刑事 [Criminal Division],
105 Niandu Chong Shanggeng San Zi No. 30 (105 年度重上更(三)字第 30 號刑事判決)
(2016) (Taiwan) (suggesting that Fantan took place before interrogation); Zuigao Fayuan
(最高法院) [Supreme Court], Xingshi 刑事 [Criminal Division], 99 Niandu Tai Shang Zi
No. 3965 (99 年度台上字第 3965 號刑事判決) (2010) (Taiwan) (mentioning Fantan as a
routine practice).
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connection will assist in any interrogation that might follow the
interview.
The very purpose of an interview is to gather information.
Officers evaluate the suspect’s behavioral responses to interview
questions. Sometimes the suspect will make an incriminating
admission or full confession during the interview without any
further interrogation. An important aspect of the interview is that it
can be conducted in a variety of settings. The place for interviews
is usually an office in the police department. However, a large
number of interviews are conducted wherever it is convenient to ask
questions, such as in a residence or office, on the street, or where an
arrest was initiated. In some cases, police officers interview the
suspect in the patrol car on the way back to the police station. 55 No
matter where interviews are conducted, there usually will be no
official taped record.
(b)
1.

Different Themes in the Interview Settings

Testing the Suspect’s Will and Finding the Suspect’s
Weakness

During Fantan, police officers often employ a deceptive
tactic that is designed to misrepresent the nature or seriousness of
the offense for which the suspect is under questioning. Police will
either withhold or exaggerate the information they show to the
suspects. For example, police may suggest to the suspects that they
are only interested in obtaining admissions to a minor crime, when
in fact they are actually investigating a serious one.56 Also, police
routinely make use of sympathy, understanding, and compassion in
order to play the role of the suspect’s friend. 57 Police officers
attempt to portray the conversation as a friendly exchange of
55

Fieldnote10:03 (notes on file with the author).
Fieldnote 18:05 (notes on file with the author); Fieldnote 19:02 (notes on file with
the author).
57 For similar practices in the U.S. police interrogation, see Richard A. Leo,
Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 259,
268 (1996) (finding that prior to any questioning, the detective begins by analyzing the
suspect’s behavior, his body movements, and demeanor, as well as the content of his
responses to different types of questions or appeals, in order to “discern the suspect’s
apparent manner of lying and truth-telling as well as his apparent psychological
vulnerabilities”).
56
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information as well as to convince the suspects that they are
concerned about their situations.58 As one police officer told me:
I will tell suspects that we should be friends. I will
emphasize that I can understand their position. But
every decision has its consequences, and it is time to
face that. I will encourage them to help me out. I
want them to understand that I am just doing my job.
The last thing I want them to feel is that I look down
on them.59
The duration of interview varies from case to case. Some
are less than five minutes, while others can last from twenty to thirty
minutes. In the preliminary interactions with suspects, investigators
use this chance to test the suspect’s will. If the suspect has a strong
will and refuses to cooperate with the investigator, the tension of the
conversation will be heightened, and different techniques will be
used. On the other hand, if the suspect appears to be cooperative
and seems willing to talk with the investigator, the interview may
soon be terminated, and the officer will proceed to a formal
interrogation.60
The practices of Fantan can be divided into several types,
depending on what police officers believe to be the best strategy. 61
The most common type of Fantan involves softening the suspect up
and establishing empathy and rapport. These techniques serve to
lessen the tension between the investigator and the suspect. 62 Police
officers intend to create a favorable climate for further interaction.
Sometimes when the investigator successfully develops this sense of
supportive emotional environment, they will choose not to ask any
further questions, particularly about issues surrounding the crime.
In these cases, the duration of the interview will be rather short and
a formal interrogation will immediately follow. Meanwhile, most of
58

Fieldnote 04:01 (notes on file with the author).
Interview 07:04 (notes on file with the author).
60 Fieldnote 08:06 (notes on file with the author).
61 For other commonly used interrogation techniques, see XU GUO-ZHEN (徐國楨),
JIEKAI ZHENXUN DE SHENMI MIANSHA (揭開偵訊的神秘面紗) [UNVEILING THE MYSTERY
OF INTERROGATION] (2008) (discussing various aspects of interrogation strategies).
62 Fieldnote 41:01 (notes on file with the author). See also CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
BUREAU, INTERROGATION TRAINING MANUAL FOR GANG-AFFILIATED CASES (archive on file
with the author).
59
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the police officers I interviewed told me that they would continue to
describe the evidence against the suspect and persuade them that it
was worthless to deny the crime. These investigators will explain
the charges and provide the suspects opportunities to cooperate.
During Fantan, investigators use a variety of strategies to
overcome the suspect’s denial. The investigators seek to importune
the suspect to confess for the good of his case, for the good of his
family, or for the good of his conscience. Moreover, police officers
can describe the evidence against the suspect and tell him
(sometimes falsely) that other co-defendants have already
confessed. 63 Also, during rapport building, investigators gather
background information and seek out suspects’ weaknesses based
on this information. Once investigators secure the suspect’s
weaknesses, those weaknesses can later be used to enhance the
suspect’s desire to cooperate. A senior police officer told me:
If the suspect denies her involvement in prostitution,
all you need to do is to call the media. You can ask
her, ‘Do you want to confess? If not, I will now call
the media.’ On the other hand, if the suspect is
married, then you tell her that you will contact her
family . . . .But this tactic only works on Taiwanese
people. If the suspects come from mainland China,
then they will probably ignore you because they have
no social connections here in Taiwan . . . .So, it
really depends on what kind of suspect you are
dealing with.64
In another case, the officer seized the suspect’s cell phone
and secured the conversation record between the suspect and the
woman with whom he was having an affair. The officer “suggested”
to the suspect that if he continued to be uncooperative the officer
would show the record to the suspect’s girlfriend “by accident.”65
Very often these techniques are combined with the threat of
putting the suspect into pretrial detention in order to trigger
tremendous psychological pressure. The suspect is led to believe
63
64
65

Fieldnote 27:05 (notes on file with the author).
Interview 13:21 (notes on file with the author).
Fieldnote 28:01 (notes on file with the author).
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that confessing to the more understated version of the crime will
lead to a kinder treatment and facilitate a speedier release from
custody.66 One of my interviewees provided a vivid example:
Pretrial detention poses an extreme burden on one’s
freedom . . . .A woman was caught by us for stealing
smart phones. She put on a helmet when she was
committing the crime. We only had the surveillance
tape, and it was not very clear. To be honest, we
could not confidently identify her as the
suspect . . . .She flatly denied committing the
crime . . . .Then I noticed she had a three-month-old
baby. I told her that if she continued to deny the
crime and did not cooperate with us, I would bring
her back and suggest that the prosecutor consider
pretrial detention. I told her that she would no longer
be able to see her newborn baby. On the other hand,
if she cooperated with me, I was going to see if we
could get her out of here [police station] as soon as
possible, so that she could go home and see her baby.
And she finally confessed.67
In sum, the tactics used during Fantan are often deceptive
insofar as they create the illusion of intimacy between the suspects
and the police officers and misrepresent the adversarial nature of the
process.68 The purpose of emulating a friendly role is to exploit the
trust inherent in these relationships. Moreover, people under police
questioning are especially drawn to immediate rewards and are less
likely to think about the consequences of their actions. They are
more likely to respond positively to police interrogation tactics. 69

66

Fieldnote 04:02 (notes on file with the author).
Interview 04:18 (notes on file with the author).
68 Another detective told me that, “by chatting with the suspect, we found out that he
had a girlfriend who was pregnant. He told us that he desperately needed some money for
her and the coming newborn . . . .I explained to him that if he confessed and provided us all
the information he knew, I would write a memo to the prosecutor and suggest that there
was no need to put him in detention . . . .I told him that this was the only way to ensure he
would see his pregnant girlfriend.” Interview 104:09 (notes on file with the author).
69 Fieldnote 09:05 (notes on file with the author).
67
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Promises and Negotiations

The deceptive tactics during Fantan often involve the use of
promises and negotiation. The promises can explicitly offer leniency
or be vague and indefinite. 70 Many police officers told me that they
will suggest a promise of leniency to the suspect, such as informing
the prosecutor of the suspect’s cooperation; or, telling the suspect
that displaying sincere remorse will be a mitigating factor; or,
saying that they will help arrange the best resolution for the suspect
if he/she confesses.71 These are in fact deceptive, since they falsely
create expectations that will not be met.
Moreover, under-the-table negotiation is a common practice.
In order to encourage the suspect to confess, investigators will make
deals with them in the shadow of the law. Police officers use
different strategies to increase their bargaining power. These
sometimes include fabricating evidence or exaggerating the
potential punishment. 72 Again, creating psychological pressure is
crucial at this stage. As one of my interviewees described:
In drug possession cases, you can tell suspects that
you can choose to report the mere possession of
drugs if the suspects confess. Otherwise, you can tell
suspects that you will take a urine sample. These
people know exactly the difference between drug
possession and drug consumption. For instance,
suppose you search a suspect’s pocket and found a
bag of amphetamines. But his urine sample might
also show a heroin reaction. In such a case, he would
be subject to two charges instead of
one . . . .Criminals are very quirky now. They will
try to fool you and seek to make good deals with you.
We have to let them know that we have sufficient
evidence to put them in jail, and it is in their best
interests to cooperate with us.73

70

Fieldnote 08:14 (notes on file with the author).
Fieldnote 20:08 (notes on file with the author); Fieldnote 26:08 (notes on file with
the author).
72 Fieldnote 08:17 (notes on file with the author).
73 Interview 02:15 (notes on file with the author).
71
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The Framing of the “Formal” Interrogation

Many police officers told me that Fantan helps them sort out
unnecessary information and better frame the structure of the later
interrogation. Interrogation records are official documents. Once
made by the interrogator, not a single word can be changed or
reframed; otherwise, the police officer may be prosecuted for
fabricating official documents.
Anything said during the
interrogation is videotaped and documented into the record. Also, if
police officers later find out that there are missing issues that need
to be addressed during interrogation, they cannot go back to the
relevant section and revise it. The policy requires the interrogator to
conduct a subsequent interrogation. 74 In doing so, the interrogator
74

One of the most significant changes that took place during the 1980s police reform
in Taiwan was an increased reliance on legal mandates as sources of authority. The main
criticism of Taiwanese police officers was that policing was often based on stereotypes,
biased motives, and political influence. People believed that law enforcement officers
differentially enforced the law. Such public perceptions led to mistrust and even hostility
toward the police. The passage of several laws and regulations in the 1980s provided
necessary mandates and resources for police officers to operate as a professionalized law
enforcement community. To achieve the goals of uniformity and equality, Taiwan’s
National Police Agency adopted Jingcha Zhencha Fanzui Shouce (警察偵查犯罪手冊)
[The Police Investigation Manual] (1980). Such written policies help ensure that individual
police officers consider and ignore the same factors during investigations, while leaving
them with the necessary discretion to do their job to the best of their abilities. The manual
governs police officers’ daily activities, such as interrogation, search and seizure, and
testifying in court. Each year, the National Police Agency replaces and supersedes all
previous versions of the manual according to changes in the relevant statutes that were
made during the year. Most importantly, the manual addresses notable new policies and
provides sufficiently clear guidelines as to the ramifications of these policies for police
officers. On the other hand, the manual is flexible enough to enable each police agency to
establish different suitable procedures that define and assign responsibilities within each
department. The manual consists of 250 rules and mainly serves to instruct police officers
about the latest legislative and judicial decisions that are taken as national policy. From
Rule 121 to Rule 132, the manual specifies, in great detail, the information that needs to be
included in the interrogation record as well as the procedure for making an interrogation
record. For instance, the Manual states that the suspect shall be permitted to read the record.
If the suspect requests to change the record, his/her statement shall be added to the record.
At the end of the interrogation, the suspect shall be ordered to affix his signature, seal, or
fingerprint to the record immediately following the last line of the record. Also, the manual
reminds officers that the interrogation record should be structured in the format of
“Question and Answer.” (Rule 123). Regarding the procedural requirements of
interrogation, the manual specifies that the interrogation should be conducted by two police
officers. One officer is in charge of questioning and the other is in charge of recording,
unless under the circumstance of exigency or inability. In the latter cases, where there is
only one interrogator, it is required to have video recording during the whole interrogation.
The purpose of having two interrogators is to increase the reliability of the interrogation
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has to complete all procedural requirements, including giving the
Miranda warnings, and produce a new interrogation record.
Obviously, most police officers will try to avoid such a troublesome
task; thus, they seek to record the interrogation in one official
document. Another relevant incentive is that interrogation records
are submitted to the department director or the head of the
department for review. Multiple and/or cluttered interrogation
records will be seen as unprofessional and negatively affect the
officer’s performance evaluation. 75 Therefore, interrogators need to
figure out what questions must be asked and how to ask them before
they turn on the camera and conduct the formal interrogation. 76
These official policies and procedures incentivize police
officers to engage in backstage questioning. Fantan becomes a
critical step in the investigation process since it provides
interrogator a chance to identify and gather necessary information
and set aside what is unimportant. 77 Interrogators can decide what
issues need to be addressed during interrogation and even predict
the answers the suspect may provide. Sometimes the interrogator
will go through the questions in advance to make sure that the
suspect will be able to understand them.78 The two-step process of
Fantan followed by the “official” interrogation makes the latter
more like a well-rehearsed drama.79 Backstage rehearsal explains
record and to enhance the quality of the communication between interrogator and suspect.
Following the adoption of the manual, many police departments have provided more
detailed supplementary explanations regarding the rules. These explanations sometimes
include information about the interrogation room’s design and about interrogation
techniques, elaborating on the suggested steps of interrogation. For instance, some
materials instruct that in a case where the suspect has chosen to remain silent, the
interrogator has to specify this circumstance in the interrogation record but is not required
to terminate the interrogation. In other materials prepared by an experienced sergeant in
charge of the investigation of burglary, sixty-five suggestions are laid out for achieving a
successful interrogation. Noticeably, in the preamble of the document, it remarks that for a
long period of time police in Taiwan used the so-called “beat first, ask later” (打了再問)
technique to overcome the objections of suspects and implies that this was a particularly
useful tactic for recidivists. An additional comment is that “torture has helped Taiwanese
police clear many cases;” and since the suspect often confessed to multiple crimes, it was a
particularly “efficient and powerful” tool. The author even directly questions the reader as
follows: “When torture is no longer available, what can the police use to overcome the
objections of the suspect?” (archive on file with the author).
75 Interview 12:02 (notes on file with the author).
76 Fieldnote 02:03 (notes on file with the author).
77 Fieldnote 02:04 (notes on file with the author).
78 Interview 15:09 (notes on file with the author).
79 Interrogation Recording 1; 2 (videos on file with the author).
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many of the scenarios in the interrogation videotapes I observed. A
detective sergeant described such practices:
You cannot really expect to get any useful
information by merely conducting the formal
interrogation. The formal interrogation must be
conducted in the form of question and answer (一問
一答), which seems rather bizarre if you compare it
with our daily conversations . . . .In formal
interrogation, you will not hear too much that is
extraneous. But a real interrogation should look like
daily conversation . . . so what we do is actually sort
out unnecessary information before the formal
interrogation. Sometimes I will take brief notes by
just chatting. Then when I conduct the formal
interrogation, all I need to do is to confirm answers
to questions with the suspects and of course, do the
videotaping.80
By talking with the suspects beforehand, interrogators can
even decide what crimes they want to deal with. 81 Editing the
information becomes practical if the suspects provide more than one
clue or contradicting messages during Fantan. 82 A police officer
said to me:
Sometimes the suspects will talk nonsense. You
really want them to clarify. If you put all this
information into the interrogation record, prosecutors
will definitely complain. Because it is required to
80

Interview 13:47 (notes on file with the author).
According to some of the defense lawyers I interviewed, conducting Fantan is
sometimes in their clients’ interests because seasoned defense attorneys can assist their
clients to “make deals” with investigative agents by confining the scope of the subsequent
interrogation to certain offenses. Some attorneys described such practices as “de facto”
plea bargains. Fieldnote 21:07 (notes on file with the author).
82 Sometimes police will include information collected from Fantan in the formal
interrogation record, even when the suspect did not reiterate those statements. See, e.g.,
Taiwan Gaodeng Fayuan (台灣高等法院) [Taiwan High Court], Xingshi 刑事 [Criminal
Division], 91 Niandu Shanggeng Yi Zi No. 386 (91 年度上更(一)字第 386 號刑事判決)
(2002) (Taiwan) (involving a case in which police included multiple statements from
Fantan into the official interrogation record and asked the suspect to confirm their
accuracy at the end of the interrogation).
81
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videotape the interrogation, you have to make sure
you have control over the process. Otherwise, you
are just getting yourself into trouble . . . .When you
ask the suspect whom he bought drugs from, he gives
you a name. You want to make sure that he does not
come up with other names during the interrogation.
Most importantly, you do not want the suspect to
bring in other stories during interrogation. If they do
so, the prosecutor will ask you to conduct further
investigation and you really will not be able to close
the case . . . .Like yesterday, a guy told me that he
had dozens of clues that he wanted to tell me. Do
you think you can put all this information into the
record? Well, no . . . not unless you want to create a
special investigation team. If you do not want to be
overloaded, then it is better to leave other clues to the
future and simply focus on one particular matter. 83

C.

THE OPERATION OF THE UNDERGROUND MIRANDA
WARNINGS

The manipulation of the Miranda warnings by police
officers poses a serious concern of its implementation. Police
officers have incentives to change the content of the original
Miranda warnings and discourage suspects from invoking their
rights.84 Such a situation has been exacerbated by the practices of
Fantan. It is crucial to closely examine whether the original vision
of Miranda protections can resonate with the practices of Fantan.
Police officers in Taiwan are now legally required to inform the
suspects that they have the rights to remain silent and to retain
counsel. 85 Essentially, the warnings mark the beginning of an
83

Interview 07:16 (notes on file with the author). Note that police in Taiwan do not
have case disposition authority. Although police have been lobbying for the recognition of
their independent investigative authority, there has been little change made to grant police
the authority to dispose of cases without permission from prosecutors. The general
Taiwanese habit and experience of distrusting police has continued after Taiwan’s
democratic transition. It is true that in recent decades the Taiwanese police have made
noticeable progress in many respects. However, problems of misconduct and corruption
continue to plague Taiwan’s police force and tarnish its image.
84 Fieldnote 17:06 (notes on file with the author).
85 See supra Part I.
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adversarial relationship. The message implied in the warnings is
that the interrogator and the suspect do not share common interests.
The original vision of the warnings is that after its issuance, the
suspects will be able to understand the adversarial nature that police
officers seek to hide. 86 However, the pre-interrogation policesuspect interactions substantially circumvent such a fundamental
design of the Miranda mechanism. In fact, police officers have
developed multiple strategies to avoid, deemphasize, and
manipulate Miranda. During Fantan, investigators can issue the
warnings in rather strategic ways or simply interrogate the suspects
without providing the warnings.
(a)

Avoiding Miranda

One of the most overlooked deception strategies police
employ is questioning the suspect in an informal setting so as to
circumvent any legal necessity of providing Miranda warnings.
According to the Miranda legislation in Taiwan, the warnings must
be given to a suspect prior to interrogation. The term “interrogation”
is legally defined as any interactions between police officer and
suspect, when the suspect is in custody or whose freedom has
otherwise been significantly deprived. Most of the police officers
indicate that they do not issue the Miranda warnings prior to Fantan.
The reason is two-fold: first, some of the police officers that I
interviewed told me that Fantan is a non-custodial stage where the
suspect is free to leave at any time. By assuring the suspect that he
is voluntarily answering questions, some police attempt to transform
what otherwise would be considered an interrogation into an
interview. By recasting an actual interrogation as an interview,
police officers are committing a legal deception. Second, and
perhaps more decisive, there is often no functional difference
between Fantan and formal interrogation.87 During Fantan, most of

86

Interview 31:07 (notes on file with the author).
See Zuigao Fayuan ( 最 高 法 院 ) [Supreme Court], Xingshi 刑 事 [Criminal
Division], 99 Niandu Tai Shang Zi No. 1893 (99 年度台上字第 1893 號) (2010) (Taiwan)
(stating that police should videotape the entire process of an interview and inform the
suspect his/her rights according to Article 95 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the
contact is the functional equivalent of an interrogation). However, this decision has very
little influence on police actual practices. See also Zuigao Fayuan (最高法院) [Supreme
Court], Xingshi 刑事 [Criminal Division], 101 Niandu Tai Shang Zi No. 2165 (101 年度台
87
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the suspects are already in custody. Some interrogators even
conduct the Fantan in interrogation room.88 The fact that there is no
video recording explains why most police officers do not provide
the Miranda warnings before questioning the suspects.
On the other hand, Fantan triggers further concerns
regarding the nullification of the whole Miranda system. If Fantan
is essentially another form of interrogation, then we have reasons to
suspect that the Miranda warnings are nothing but flowery openings
of a “legal drama.” Fantan and Xunwen should be seen as a “twostep” interrogation, where the former is completely out of judicial
scrutiny. During Fantan, police officers can either neglect or
downplay the significance of Miranda. Some even describe the
negative effect if the suspects chose to invoke their rights.89 Among
all the tactics my interviewees described, the manipulation of the
Miranda warnings is perhaps the main reason why the intended
safeguards are largely circumvented. Police officers in Taiwan
gradually developed what I refer to as the “underground” Miranda
warnings.
(b)

Manipulating Miranda

The empirical data I collected indicates that police officers
in Taiwan always recite the familiar Miranda warnings before
“formal” interrogation. The warnings are issued in a standardized
form based on the requirements of the law. The “front-stage”
Miranda warnings are videotaped and are under close judicial
scrutiny. Here I would like to show how the “backstage” or
“underground” Miranda warnings operate.
During the pre-Mirandized conversations, police officers
often manipulate the context of the legally required Miranda
warnings. They deliver the warnings in a perfunctory tone and
ritualistically behavioral manner. By doing so, they attempt to
convey that these warnings are little more than bureaucratic
procedure. During initial contact with suspects, police officers will
provide a preamble of the Miranda warnings. The purpose is to tell
the suspects that later, when the officers turn on the camera and start
上字第 2165 號刑事判決) (2012) (Taiwan) (stating that Fantan practices could constitute
“improper means” and affect the voluntariness of the confession).
88 Fieldnote 37:05 (notes on file with the author).
89 Fieldnote 37:07 (notes on file with the author).
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the interrogation, they are legally obligated to issue these
warnings. 90 Meanwhile, investigators seek to undermine the
importance of Miranda by downplaying the potential significance of
the warnings. 91 At this stage, some police officers recite the
warnings in a trivializing manner to maximize the likelihood that
the suspect will waive these rights during the formal interrogation.
These early actions could explain the reason why police officers are
so successful in obtaining waivers at latter stages of the
investigation.
In short, during Fantan, police officers often minimize,
downplay, or deemphasize the Miranda warnings.
The
interrogators anticipate that the suspect will not see the Miranda
warnings as a crucial transition point during the police-suspect
interaction. They count on the suspect missing the significance of
their opportunity to terminate the interrogation; instead, seeing the
administration of Miranda warnings as something akin to routine
bureaucratic practices where one can sign the form without reading
or giving much attention to its implication. Police in Taiwan often
portray the reading of Miranda warnings as a trivial bureaucratic
ritual and indicate that they anticipate most suspects will waive their
rights and make statements.92
Interrogators can even directly manipulate the Miranda
warnings. Instead of asking whether suspects wish to speak to them,
interrogators tend to ask suspects whether they want to “explain his
situation or excuses” or whether they want to “hear how officers can
help them.”93 Moreover, interrogators often provide what I call the
“Taiwanese version of Miranda warnings,” where the police tell a
suspect, “you may remain silent, but doing so will do you no
good,”94 and “you may retain a defense attorney, but it will simply
waste your time and money.” 95 By convincing suspects that the
interrogators are acting in their best interests, some interrogators

90

Fieldnote 07:10 (notes on file with the author).
Fieldnote 07:06 (notes on file with the author).
92 Some defense attorneys believe that, with the greater involvement of the Taiwan’s
Legal Aid Foundation (財團法人法律扶助基金會) in recent years to provide free legal
counsel to suspects during police interrogation, police are less likely to conduct such
practices. This is, of course, an empirical question to be examined in the future.
93 Interview 13:15 (notes on file with the author).
94 Interview 15:05 (notes on file with the author).
95 Interview 16:08 (notes on file with the author).
91
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seek to provide suspects with free “legal counsel.” 96 They seek to
convince suspects that the warnings are simply a formality.
Interrogators tell suspects that if they want to clarify their innocence
or provide any information, they will first need to waive their
Miranda rights. Since most suspects want to have their voice heard,
waiving their Miranda rights becomes a matter of routine. 97
Moreover, if a suspect responds to the Miranda warnings by stating
his/her intention to have a defense lawyer present during
questioning, police officers often initiate further conversation with
the suspect in the hope that the suspect will change his/her mind
about invoking Miranda rights. There are various strategies for
prompting suspects to waive their Miranda rights even after they
have invoked the right to legal counsel. For instance, one police
officer told me that when the suspect intends to get a lawyer, he will
explain to them:
There is no need to waste your time and money on a
lawyer at this stage. All a lawyer can do is sit
silently behind you—and do nothing. I suggest that
you [the suspect] save your money and hire a lawyer
after you meet the prosecutor or go on to the court
proceedings.98
Most of the police officers believe that the role of a lawyer is
simply to be a witness and make sure that the interrogators do not
torture the suspect. They often tell suspects that since they are
videotaping the process of interrogation, it is impossible for them to
use torture. Moreover, some interrogators will provide suspects
with what they believe is the “correct” legal advice, such as “a
96

With a growing number of lawyers joining the Legal Aid Foundation to provide
government-funded legal defense services during police interrogations, some lawyers I met
suspect that the police are gradually becoming more accustomed to the presence of lawyers
and less hostile towards them. Again, whether this means police have been less likely in
recent years—and will be less likely in the future—to manipulate Miranda remains an
open empirical question.
97 By civilizing the process of interrogation, the warnings implicitly suggest to
suspects that the police are respectful of their rights, the police are not only law-abiding but
also fair and objective. Delivered in the proper manner, the warnings could even suggest to
suspects that the investigators are sympathetic and willing to listen to whatever they have
to say. Such a message enhances some suspects’ belief that they can actually convince the
interrogator to release them.
98 Interview 09:37 (notes on file with the author).
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lawyer is not allowed to speak or assist you during the
interrogation;” 99 “lawyers won’t tell you anything that I have not
already told you;”100 “most lawyers you hire are money-driven;”101
“free legal counsel is intended to encourage you to confess;” 102 or
“lawyers cannot accompany you during the interrogation, they can
only watch the process through close-circuit television.” 103
Apparently, some of these legal advice are false. However, in the
initial contact with the criminal justice system, most suspects do not
have other channels to acquire basic legal knowledge. They tend to
rely on what police officers tell them. This likely explains why
suspects in Taiwan often respond to police questioning without
defense lawyers present. Interrogators seek to convince suspects
that the function of a defense lawyer is to be a mere witness.
Therefore, the initial visions of the Miranda legislations are largely
compromised.104
99

Interview 09:38 (notes on file with the author).
Interview 12:09 (notes on file with the author).
101 Interview 03:12 (notes on file with the author).
102 Interview 14:07 (notes on file with the author).
103 Interview 36:06 (notes on file with the author).
104 Some investigators even told me that they expect the defense counsel to act like
“Hello Kitty” ( 凱 蒂 貓 )—a popular fictional cat that has no mouth—during the
interrogation process. Under the proposed adversarial system in Taiwan, defense lawyers
should stand in the position of greatest opposition to police and prosecutors. In reality,
however, defense lawyers in Taiwan have little power to influence how law enforcement
officers investigate, dispose of, or assist in the trying of cases. Throughout the criminal
process, the function of defense lawyers is largely restricted by law, tradition, and legal
culture. Therefore, defense lawyers can do very little for suspects and defendants. The
practical result is that suspects may consider invoking their Miranda rights as meaningless
and feel they have no choice but to talk to interrogators. Most of the defense lawyers that I
interviewed mentioned that they should relate to police and prosecutors as cooperatively
and constructively as possible. Interestingly, almost all my interviewees said that they had
never actively recommended that a suspect or defendant exercise the right to remain silent.
Only a few of them have ever suggested that their client to remain silent, most under
circumstances when the suspect was uncertain or confused by police questions; the suspect
had difficulty communicating; or the suspect and the police had violently quarreled during
interrogation. More importantly, even under such rare circumstances, defense lawyers did
not advise their clients to remain silent during the entire interrogation. Instead, clients were
advised to answer some police questions and therefore only remain partially silent. Given
the many psychological interrogation techniques for extracting Miranda waivers and
confessions, and how infrequently Taiwanese defense lawyers counsel a strategy of silence,
the fact that most suspects in Taiwan waive their Miranda rights and talk to the police is
hardly surprising. For a social science study of defense attorneys’ role during criminal
investigations in China, see SIDA LIU & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN
CHINA: THE POLITICS OF LAWYERS AT WORK 52-53 (2016) (describing the difficulties in
meeting and communicating with suspects).
100
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Unlike the front-stage Miranda warnings, the underground
Miranda system does not have a clear format. It is often bent into
the conversation, consisting of various topics. Specifically, two
reasons can be given to explain why the operation of the
underground Miranda warnings is rather difficult to detect and
address officially. First of all, there is no specific time when police
officers must provide backstage warnings as compared to the clearly
prescribed timing of the front-stage warnings codified in law. In
fact, most of the so-called “warnings” are legal advice offered
during pre-Mirandized conversation. For some suspects, this legal
advice may be convincing because it is often well tailored to their
cases. Investigators can describe the existing evidence and
convince the suspect that hiring a lawyer will not make any
difference. Or, as in the cases discussed above, investigators can
use suspects’ weaknesses against them to diminish their intention to
invoke any legally provided rights. Therefore, how police officers
alter the wording of their warnings to convince suspects to waive
their rights is no longer the central issue. The reality is even more
complicated since the relevant rights have been framed and
relocated to the context of the psychological process during Fantan.
Second, the underground Miranda system is still largely free
from judicial scrutiny. 105 Fantan occurs in various settings. It
could occur anywhere between an arrest’s initiation and the police
station. Moreover, there is no official record that can be used to
reconstruct such police-suspect interactions. Most of the defense
lawyers I interviewed recognized the practices of Fantan. And they
believed such practices seriously undermine the proper functioning
of defense counsel. However, none of them sought to petition the
court to argue such practices illegally damage Miranda protections.
The lack of evidence is the main reason for their inaction. Fantan is
most likely to occur when the suspect is not accompanied by a
lawyer. In these cases, the suspect becomes the only witness.
In short, the legislators’ mandatory videotaping of
interrogations has not resolved all problems. The safety net that the
videotaping policy seeks to create can be achieved only if the entire
105

In fact, the goal of introducing the Miranda rule in Taiwan was to limit, even
eliminate, the exercise of police discretion during interrogation. However, the trend seems
to be in the opposite direction––to eliminate discretion where it is most visible, as in the
formal interrogation proceeding, while neglecting its continued existence where it is less
visible, as it is at the Fantan stage.
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session is recorded. However, the formal legal requirements have
been compromised by the long-entrenched underground police
activities and the sophisticated Guanxi network that exists among
police, defense attorneys, and suspects. Judicial scrutiny is largely
limited to the public, “front-stage” interrogation, and the “visible”
Miranda system. The practices of Fantan are entirely overlooked––
that is the missing story of Miranda in Taiwan.

III.

POLICE INTERROGATION AND THE CONCERNS OF
FALSE CONFESSIONS
A.

The Changing Landscape

Prior to the advent of forensic DNA testing, most observers
of the Taiwanese criminal justice system, professional and lay alike,
believed that the risk of error in criminal cases was remote and
negligible. For many of Taiwan’s law enforcement personnel,
judges, prosecutors, and even defense lawyers, once a confession is
made, the case was over––there was no need for further
investigation or litigation. While the Code of Criminal Procedure
recognized the possibility of false confessions and the potential
unreliability of confession evidence, 106 in practice almost no one
took the risk factors in individual cases seriously.
With the help of many non-governmental organizations,
Taiwanese people now know better that both the perception of
virtual infallibility of criminal procedure, as well as the intuitive
sense that no suspect would falsely confess to a crime he/she did not
commit, are inaccurate.107 The specific DNA exonerations and the
media coverage of wrongful conviction cases generally have shown
that error in the criminal justice system is real and that false
confessions are one of the leading contributors to wrongful

106
See Code of Criminal Procedure, § 12, Art. 156 (2003) (Taiwan) (“Confession of
an accused, or a co-offender, shall not be used as the sole basis of conviction and other
necessary evidence shall still be investigated to see if the confession is consistent with the
facts.”).
107 For example, in 2012 the Taiwan Association for Innocence was established,
modeled on the Innocence Project in the United States. It is currently the most active nongovernmental organization helping to exonerate the wrongly convicted and providing the
public with the latest studies of wrongful convictions in countries such as Japan and the
United States.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

34

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 17

convictions. 108 In particular, false confessions both directly and
indirectly influence wrongful convictions. Previous examinations
on Taiwan’s wrongful conviction cases reveal that a substantial
percentage of cases in which an innocent individual was convicted,
he/she falsely confessed to being a perpetrator. 109
Inducing confessions have remained central to Taiwanese
law enforcement practices even following the enactment of modern
criminal procedural rules. 110 Torture was still widely seen as an
acceptable method of obtaining a full confession as of the late
1990s. 111 Examples of documented methods of extracting
confessions include: sleep deprivation, promise of timely release,
threatening more stringent punishments, isolation, lack of privacy,
slapping, punching, kicking, or beating suspects, extended
questioning often starting early in the morning and lasting until late
at night, binding fingers, making suspects stand in certain positions,
shouting in a suspects’ ears, and forcing suspects to drink large
amounts of water. 112 The deep-rooted value of truth-seeking, and
108 See also Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in
the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 923 (2004) (suggesting that “[c]onfession
evidence . . . is so biasing that juries will convict on the basis of confession alone, even
when no significant or credible evidence confirms the disputed confession and
considerable significant and credible evidence disconfirms it”).
109 See TAIWAN YUANYU PINGFAN X IEHUI (台灣冤獄平反協會) [TAIWAN INNOCENCE
PROJECT], https://twinnocenceproject.org [https://perma.cc/L7NC-446N] (last visited Sept.
20, 2021).
110 The traditional Chinese legal system has been characterized as one of substantive
justice, which we can contrast to the procedural justice model favored by Western liberal
democracies. The hallmarks of a substantive justice model are the pursuit of truth and the
achievement of a just result. Accordingly, traditional Chinese criminal procedures were
designed to uncover the truth as a necessary part of the justice process. The value of truthseeking (發現真實) was later incorporated into the inquisitorial model of the modern
Taiwanese criminal justice system. Within the inquisitorial system, Taiwan’s court was
actively involved in investigating the facts of the case. Moreover, during criminal
investigations, the police and prosecutors placed great importance on the process of
obtaining confessions, regardless of whether a suspect’s rights were violated in the process.
111 For general review, see generally CHANG CHUAN-FEN (張娟芬), WUCAI QINGCHUN
(無彩青春) [COLORLESS YOUTH] (2004); JUDICIAL REFORM FOUNDATION (財團法人民間
司改基金會), ZHENGYI DE YINYING (正義的陰影) [THE SHADOW OF JUSTICE] (2002). For a
study of the use of torture by the Chicago Police Department, see LAURENCE RALPH, THE
TORTURE LETTERS: RECKONING WITH POLICE VIOLENCE xiii, 144 (2020) (arguing that police
torture is a transnational concern).
112 The most famous case recently was the torture of Chiou Ho-Shun (邱和順), who
was tortured by police officers during interrogation in 1988. Chiou was wrongfully
sentenced to death and imprisoned for almost 23 years. He was released in 2011. The
shocking process of torture, including slapping, cursing and beating, was later revealed to
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the obsession of confession, in Taiwan’s criminal justice system has
caused a significant problem because sacrificing citizens’ rights in
order to obtain the truth challenges the legitimacy of the Taiwanese
criminal justice system by undermining the very concepts of
democracy.
Modern criminal justice reforms in Taiwan have
successfully suppressed the use of physical coercion during police
interrogation. However, the changing nature of police interrogation
in Taiwan poses yet another serious problem. Psychological
manipulation and deception have replaced physical coercion as the
strategic underpinnings of the information-gathering techniques
Taiwanese police employ. Where police questioning once routinely
involved physical coercion, it now involves sophisticated
psychological ploys, tricks, manipulative techniques, persuasion,
and deception. The majority of police officers I met strongly
condemn the use of physical force during interrogation. 113 They
believe that psychological tactics can be effective at securing
confessions. In short, the use of deception and psychological
manipulation has become an alternative to the use of violence.
Many police officers believe further that abolishing the use of
torture and physical force means false confessions are no longer an
issue of concern.114 In the following sections, I examine the current
structure of the criminal justice system and evaluate the changing
landscape of false confessions.
B.

The Problems of Backstage Policing

Discretion is a necessary component in daily police
practices. 115 Police officers in Taiwan enjoy high levels of
the public. For the sound record, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rdEZSfDr-AQ
[https://perma.cc/49AR-CCZE];
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b72uWB1Dc6s
[https://perma.cc/7GKK-EXAP] (last visited Sept. 20, 2021).
113 Fieldnote 33:14 (notes on file with the author).
114
Fieldnote 35:02 (notes on file with the author). See also Deborah Davis & Richard
A. Leo, Interrogation-Related Regulatory Decline: Ego Depletion, Failures of SelfRegulation, and the Decision to Confess, 18 PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC P OLICY, AND LAW 673,
676 (2012) (suggesting that “[e]xcept in the most egregious circumstances of suspect
vulnerability and physical coercion . . . [confession] will likely be presumed true and
voluntary by police (even defense) attorneys, judges, juries and appellate courts”).
115 In a comparative context, the American Bar Foundation (ABF) Survey of Criminal
Justice between 1953–1969 was a groundbreaking study in the history of policing. It
reversed the long pattern of neglect by opening a window, through its unique research
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discretion given the at times difficult nature of their job. 116 Yet
discretion often leads to abuse and creates difficulty for effective
oversight. It is usually expected that tighter controls and supervision
will curb abuse. However, one problem with tighter control is that
it causes abuse to become more secretive and harder to detect. This
perhaps explains the current front-stage/backstage interrogation
practices in Taiwan. My empirical data shows how interrogators in
Taiwan have adapted to the Miranda rule. Police officers have
developed sophisticated strategies for circumventing Miranda’s
obstacles to a successful interrogation. The underlying strategy is to
convince suspects it is not only expected that they waive their rights
and make a statement but also advantageous for them.
During my fieldwork, I discovered that interrogators are
most likely to employ sophisticated interrogation strategies when
the camera is off. In backstage settings, law only plays a marginal
role in directing and moderating police behaviors. Personal
relationships are constructed, and various social norms are relied
upon. Police interrogation is a discretion-heavy activity in which
interrogators enjoy considerable latitude in determining how the law
should be framed and executed. Criminal investigation involves
complex tasks which no set of rules, guidelines, and instructions can
fully regulate. In fact, the main goal of Taiwan’s modern criminal
justice reform is to limit, if not fully eliminate, police discretion.
However, police persistently find ways to cope with legal reforms
and restrictions by conducting backstage work.
My findings show that interrogators are now able to
minimize Miranda’s impact most effectively when it is most
important for them to secure a confession. My findings also suggest
that police interrogation is like a theater stage on which
methodology, into the world of policing. The study’s observations painted a picture of
police operations in which the discretion of individual officers was pervasive. In the
original field reports, the ABF researchers recorded incident after incident in which
officers at the lowest level in the organization were making extremely important decisions
with little, if any, guidance (archives on file with the author). Since the ABF survey, many
studies have been completed that have added substantially to our understanding of police
discretion. Meanwhile, documentation of this vast sea of discretion, found from the top to
the bottom of a policy agency, raised profound questions about fairness, accountability,
and control.
116 Anne M. Coughlin, Interrogation Stories, 95 VA. L. REV. 1599, 1610–18 (2009)
(arguing that the law imposes only minimal constraints on police interrogation and that
“the police are left with plenty of room to maneuver when assisting suspects to make
confession”).
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interrogators and suspects perform their particular roles. By
minimizing outside scrutiny, they negotiate, practice, and rehearse
before they go on stage. It is therefore safe to conclude, in a sense,
that the whole practice is deceptive.
C.

Pretrial Detention and the Devastating Impact of Silence

The manipulation of Miranda and the practices of preinterrogation interview, or Fantan, pose serious roadblocks to the
proper functioning of the Miranda rule. Suspects may be confused
about their rights which undermines the importance of invoking
those rights. Moreover, the current practice of pretrial detention
further exacerbates the situation. It conveys a clear message to
suspects under interrogation: invoking one’s Miranda rights is a
risky and worthless decision.
The function of pretrial detention helps police officers
secure a suspect’s confession through a subsequent two-stage
process: first, heighten the pressure of interrogation and, later,
prolong the duration of interrogation. Police officers tend to use
pretrial detention as a threat to induce suspect’s cooperation. As I
have demonstrated, one of the main goals of the pre-interrogation
interview setting is to weaken the suspect’s resistance and find
his/her weakness. Pretrial detention is the most useful weapon for
police as it places a tremendous burden on one’s freedom. Taiwan’s
Supreme Court has ruled that merely informing the suspect of the
possibility of detention does not constitute a “threat” and thus is not
a violation of Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 117 In
this sense, suspects may decide to waive their Miranda rights in
order to avoid pretrial detention.
More importantly, the actions of police officers indicate
another issue that is almost disappearing from the current debate:
the lack of judicial scrutiny over the practice of pretrial detention.
That is, if prosecutors believe a suspect should be detained further,
they must ask a judge, within eight hours of receiving the case, to
approve up to two months of additional detention. Prosecutors may
See Zuigao Fayuan ( 最 高 法 院 ) [Supreme Court], Xingshi 刑 事 [Criminal
Division], 103 Niandu Tai Shang Zi No. 1438 (103 年度台上字第 1438 號刑事判決)
(2014) (Taiwan); Zuigao Fayuan (最高法院) [Supreme Court], Xingshi 刑事 [Criminal
Division], 109 Niandu Tai Shang Zi No. 2660 (109 年度台上字第 2660 號刑事判決)
(2020) (Taiwan).
117
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later ask for another two-month extension. Therefore, police and
prosecutors can detain a suspect for up to four months for
investigation. During such pretrial period, interrogations can be
long and very intense. Police and prosecutors can routinely
interrogate suspects several hours each time. Some Taiwanese
defense lawyers have described such practices as having the power
to break even the toughest soul. 118 Confessions obtained during
extended lawful detention are not considered as coerced and are not
subject to exclusion in court.
Under the current practice, judges rarely reject prosecutors’
requests for detention, especially when a suspect refuses to provide
“his/her side of the story” or remains silent. 119 Many defense
lawyers also criticize that judiciary as acting merely as a rubber
stamp of approval as to these requests. But some judges may be
genuinely concerned about public safety, afraid that if they deny
prosecutors’ requests for detention, they will have to take full
responsibility for the suspects’ behavior if more crimes are
committed during release from detention.
118 Similar concerns have been documented in studies of Japanese police interrogation
practices. See, e.g., Johannes Feest & Masayuki Murayama, Protecting the Innocent
Through Criminal Justice: A Case Study from Spain, Virtually Compared to Germany and
Japan, in CONTRASTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE 49, 68 (David
Nelken ed., 2000); Steinhoff, supra note 50, at 844 (stating that Japanese police achieved
“a very high rate of confession, not because Japanese criminal suspects were falling all
over themselves to confess voluntarily, and not because the police flagrantly violated the
law to coerce confession, but rather because the legal environment itself was so enabling”).
See also COLIN P. A. JONES & FRANK S. RAVITCH, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 257, 257
(2018) (suggesting that “some suspects might . . . reasonably conclude [that] a confession
is the only way to escape from the very stressful conditions of the interrogation room”). In
fact, contrary to the Miranda rule, the law requires arresting authorities to invite suspects
to make a statement rather than informing them of their right to remain silent. Article
203(1) of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure requires that, once a suspect has been
arrested, he/she must be informed of the nature of the crime for which he/she has been
arrested on suspicion of as well his/her right to have defense counsel appointed, and be
given the opportunity for explanation ( 弁 解 ). See also Weisselberg, Exporting and
Importing, supra note 5, at 1240–43 (explaining how confessions are central to the
Japanese legal system and how their laws “facilitate interrogations”).
119 The overall approval rate is about 80%, although there has been a slight decline in
more recent years. See Ministry of Justice, Difang Jianchashu Xin Shou Xingshi Zhencha
Anjian ji Xiang Fayuan Shengqing Jiya Qingxing (地方檢察署新收刑事偵查案件及向法
院聲請羈押情形 ) [The District Public Prosecutor’s Office Newly Accepted Criminal
Investigation Cases and Applications to the Court for Detention], FAWU TONGJI (法務統計)
[LEGAL
AFFAIRS
STATISTICS],
https://www.rjsd.moj.gov.tw/rjsdweb/common/WebList3_Report.aspx?list_id=822
[https://perma.cc/F8G3-JCXC] (last visited Sept. 20, 2021).
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Finally, combined with the duty to submit to questioning and
the format of the written interrogation record, invoking the right to
remain silent is more like a direct ticket to pretrial detention. Under
current interrogation practices, police officers will not terminate the
interrogation even after the suspect invokes his/her Miranda rights
and remains silent. The interrogator will continue to ask questions
and write down the interrogation record at the same time. If the
suspect refuses to answer, the interrogator will simply write down
“remained silent” or “refused to answer.”120 When the court later
reviews the written interrogation record, the suspect’s reaction will
look rather suspicious. Judging from the format of the interrogation
record, remaining silent is akin to admitting guilt. 121 Also, such
practices indicate that the suspect has the right to remain silent but
does not have the right to refuse police questioning or terminate the
interrogation. 122 The absence of the right to terminate police
questioning has in practice been transformed into a duty to submit
oneself to an often prolonged interrogation.123 In short, the suspect
120

Fieldnote 33:04 (notes on file with the author).
Invoking one’s Miranda rights may be seen as a rational decision only when
defense lawyer can be expected to perform their defense work efficiently. Simply
remaining silent is a devastating decision when no one else will speak for you. John
Langbein’s classic analysis regarding the origins of the privilege against-incrimination
remain an accurate depiction of what actually happened in Taiwan: “the right to remain
silent when no one else can speak for you is simply the right to slit your throat, and it is
hardly a mystery that defendants did not hasten to avail themselves of such a
privilege . . . .Without defense counsel, a criminal defendant’s right to remain silent was
the right to forfeit any defense . . . Only when defense counsel succeed in restructuring the
criminal trial to make it possible to silence the accused did it also become possible to
fashion the true privilege against self-incrimination . . . .The privilege against selfincrimination became functional only as a consequence of the revolutionary reconstruction
of the criminal trial worked by the advent of defense counsel and adversary criminal
procedure.” John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1054, 1084 (1994).
122 For a comparative study of interrogation practices in France that treat the suspect as
a source of information, see Bron McKillop, Anatomy of a French Murder Case, 45 AM. J.
COMP. L. 527, 575, 577 (1997) (suggesting that an accused “was expected . . . to divulge
what he knew about the relevant event to complement the version otherwise established,”
and that an accused “is obliged to submit to interrogation”).
123 Moreover, subsequently in trial, Taiwanese prosecutors can impeach a defendant
with his/her silence following the provision of Miranda warnings. The prosecution can also
bring out the fact that a defendant invoked his/her Miranda rights. Such practices are in
stark contrast with U.S. Miranda jurisprudence, where a suspect’s silence or invocation
following a Miranda advisement may not be used by the prosecution in any fashion except
where the suspect introduces the topic or falsely testifies to having given exculpatory
information during the interview. The Court held it was improper to cross-examine about
121
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may choose not to answer questions. However, the suspect has to
remain present and listen to police questioning. The original
Miranda’s protections in Taiwan should have included the right to
terminate interrogation. Ideally, as soon as the suspect expresses
his/her unwillingness to submit to police questioning, the
interrogation would have to be terminated. The Miranda protections
have in effect been eradicated in Taiwan in light of the existence of
the obligation to submit to questioning. In this sense, suspects in
Taiwan only have the right not to answer any questions against their
will, not the right to silence. If an interrogator can get the suspect to
change his/her mind during the questioning, then the suspect’s
answer to questions is not in violation of the Code of the Criminal
Procedure. In attempting to get the suspect to change his/her mind
and decide to cooperate, the police will almost always continue to
question the suspect even after the invocation of the right to
silence.124
Unlike the common scenario in the United States, where
once suspects assert their right not to answer questions or right to
counsel the interrogation must stop, 125 the current interrogation
practices in Taiwan neither compel the cessation of interrogation
the failure to provide the exculpatory information to the arresting officer, where the suspect
had remained silent after a Miranda warning. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976).
But see Alschuler, supra note 9, at 860 (proposing new Miranda jurisprudence in which
prosecutors are permitted to comment on silence). For a comparative perspective from
France, see id. at 676 (suggesting that “[t]he legal culture in France would not support a
rule, as in some common law jurisdictions, prohibiting comment by a judge or a prosecutor
to a jury on the failure of an accused to answer questions from the police”).
124 See also TAIPEI LÜSHI GONGHUI ( 台 北 律 師 公 會 ) [TAIPEI B AR ASSOCIATION],
QIANGJIU BEIGAO: LUSHI ZAI JINGJU JIAOZHAN SHOUCE (搶救被告：律師在警局教戰手冊)
[ADVISING A SUSPECT IN THE POLICE STATION: MANUAL FOR ATTORNEYS] 59–60, 132 (2014)
(recommending defense counsel to inform their clients of such practices).
125 The Miranda decision itself stated unequivocally that, when an attorney is
requested, interrogation must cease until counsel is present. The suspect must have an
opportunity to confer with the attorney and have the attorney present during any
subsequent questioning. Miranda, supra note 3, at 474 (1966). The Court later made it
clear that there is a total ban on police initiating a reinterview after such an invocation.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). It has also held that post-invocation
responses to further questioning may not be used to cast doubt on an unambiguous request
for counsel. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100 (1984). See also Alschuler, supra note 9, at
874 (stating that Miranda’s promise of a right to counsel during questioning is not really a
right to counsel; rather “[i]t is an incantation that suspects can use to shut down
questioning.”); PAUL BUTLER, CHOCK HOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 208–09 (2017)
(describing that once the right to counsel is asserted in the United States, the interrogation
should stop).
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nor prohibit future interrogation sessions. Therefore, suspects are
obliged to submit to police questioning even when they have stated
their refusal to answer questions. It suggests that a duty to attend
interrogation—merely being present and subjected to questioning—
is not inconsistent with the protections of the Taiwanese Miranda
mechanism.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, police and prosecutors
have up to four months to detain a suspect before prosecuting him
or her. Legally speaking, the suspect can be forced to sit through
police questioning continuously. The suspect’s insistence on
invoking his/her right to remain silent will likely to be undermined
following the daily questioning that ensues over such a long period.
The duty to submit to police questioning essentially prevents the
suspect from exercising his/her right to silence. Very few suspects
can insist on such right not to answer questions while being
physically subject to questioning. For the rest, the right to silence is
very likely eroded by daily questioning over many consecutive days.
D.

Is False Confession a Live Issue? The False Confession
Phenomenon

Although the concept of a false confession actually dates
back centuries, academic research in Taiwan has seldom paid much
attention to this issue. In the United States, a substantial academic
literature on false confession began to accumulate as early as the
1980s.
Scholars have long pointed out the importance of
interrogation and the potential for false confession. Saul M. Kassin
and Lawrence Wrightsman first pioneered this research. They
identify three categories of false confession: voluntary, coercedcompliant, and coerced internalized. 126
Since Kassin and
Wrightsman, Richard Ofshe and Richard Leo have been the leading
false confession scholars in the United States. While generally
accepting Kassin and Wrightsman’s triple-pronged framework,
Ofshe and Leo have developed a four-part false confession typology:
stress-complaint, coerced-compliant, non-coerced persuaded, and
coerced persuaded. 127 In a later article, Leo and Mark Costanzo
126 Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False
Confessions: Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125 (1996).
127 Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational
Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 997 (1997). See also Richard A.
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developed different classification criteria by looking across two
dimensions: instrumental or authentic, and voluntary or coerced. 128
The current interrogation practices in Taiwan are
dangerously conducive to producing false confessions.129 However,
social psychologists and legal scholars in Taiwan have not provided
sufficient guidance for reforming the current system. Nor has the
judicial system actively sought to address issues surrounding policeinduced false confessions. Social science studies in the United
States demonstrate that prolonged physical torture is likely to induce
suspects to confess to crimes they did not commit. 130 However, a
less stringent form of interrogation allows individual strengths and
vulnerabilities to have an effect. A significant number of young
adults falsely confess when subjected to a psychologically coercive
interrogation that lasts several hours. 131 When the situational
Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and
Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (studying sixty cases of police-induced false confession)
[hereinafter Consequences of False Confessions].
128 Mark Costanzo & Richard A. Leo, Research and Expert Testimony on
Interrogations and Confessions, in EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY FOR THE COURTS
69, 69–82 (Mark Costanzo et al., eds., 2007).
129 A common practice among local police is to build long-term relationships with
certain suspects in order to “make crime” at the right time. For instance, a detective
explained to me, “I arrest many prostitutes in my jurisdiction. I will always treat them with
politeness. They use their own labor to make money and do not hurt anyone. I will interact
with them and try to build a pleasant atmosphere. Then, they will often share their life
stories with me . . . .If later the court issues an order of detention and it needs to be
executed here at the local police station, I will do them [the prostitutes] a favor and provide
them “human sentiment” (賣人情). I will let them choose the day on which they prefer to
fulfill their legal duty. Most of them choose the week when they have their period, because
they won’t be able to work during that week anyway . . . .On other occasions, when I face
the pressure of performance assessments (績效壓力) from supervising agencies and I must
achieve certain quotas, I will ask them to do me a favor (還人情). I will ask them to come
to my police station and confess to offenses so that I can increase my execution rate. If you
do not know how to build such relationships with them, they will often run away, and you
will have a hard time doing your job.” Interview 105:05 (notes on file with the author). For
a similar practice in drug cases observed by a former Taiwanese prosecutor, see WU HSINYIN (吳忻穎), NIUQU DE ZHENGYI (扭曲的正義) [DISTORTION OF JUSTICE] 155–56 (2021).
130 LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 7, at 195–236.
131 See generally Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Tales from the Juvenile
Confession Front: A Guide to How Standard Police Interrogation Tactics Can Produce
Coerced and False Confessions from Juvenile Suspects, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS,
AND ENTRAPMENT 127, 128, 152 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004); Feld, supra note 52, at
244–46; Ferguson & Leo, supra note 7, at 945; Allison D. Redlich et al., The Police
Interrogation of Children and Adolescents, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND
ENTRAPMENT 107, 109–10, 113 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004); Elizabeth S. Scott &
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pressures are weak, only the most psychologically vulnerable people
are likely to falsely confess. The most dangerous situation is when
a psychologically vulnerable suspect is subjected to a highly
coercive interrogation.132
Social scientists and legal scholars in the United States have
continually argued that false confessions may involve not just
coercion but also the ability to convince an innocent suspect to
develop a crime narrative. 133 When that narrative is contaminated
by the disclosure of key facts, absent DNA tests, the criminal justice
system cannot untangle what has actually transpired. U.S. scholars
have long recommended that judges evaluate the reliability of the
entire interrogation rather than simply focusing on Miranda
warnings or voluntariness. 134 Unfortunately, concerns regarding
contaminated confessions are missing from both academic and
criminal justice debates in Taiwan. In the previous sections, I have
demonstrated and explained the shift from coercive to deceptive
styles of interrogation in Taiwan. The use of force and duress to
elicit confessions has given way to psychologically sophisticated
techniques. To some extent, the movement from coercion to
deception represents a triumph of the rule of law since police in
Taiwan have become oriented to the legal norms of due process and
human right protections. Police generally no longer resort to
physical violence or other highly coercive interrogation tactics.
Nevertheless, the current interrogation practices inevitably entail
risks of false confessions. Miranda warnings and the legal mandate
Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile
Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 156–76 (1997).
132 Allison D. Redlich & Saul M. Kassin, Police Interrogation and False Confession:
The Inherent Risk of Youth, in CHILDREN AS VICTIMS, WITNESS, AND OFFENDERS:
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW 275, 280 (Bette L. Bottoms et al., eds., 2009)
(suggesting that the two most commonly cited risk factors for false confessions—as to the
characteristics of the suspect—are youth and mental impairment). See also ACKER &
REDLICH, supra note 52, at 160–61; Cloud et al., supra note 11, at 495, 590; I. Bruce
Frumkin, Expert Testimony in Juvenile and Adult Alleged False-Confession Cases, 50
COURT REVIEW 12, 15 (2014); Kassin et al., supra note 7, at 30; Saul M. Kassin, The
Social Psychology of False Confessions, 9 SOCIAL ISSUES AND POLICY REVIEW 25, 41–42
(2015) (arguing that Miranda warnings do not adequately protect adolescents and
individuals who are mentally retarded); Allison D. Redlich et al., Self-Reported False
Confessions and False Guilty Pleas Among Offenders with Mental Illness, 34 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 79 (2010).
133 See generally Kassin & Kiechel, supra note 126, at 125–28; Saul M. Kassin, The
Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 221, 221–32 (1997).
134 Kassin et al., supra note 7, at 27.
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to record interrogations are two major protections for suspects.
However, police in Taiwan systematically create a backstage
interrogation setting in which Miranda warnings are being
manipulated and no official records are available. Without
complete information on backstage policing, we simply do not
know how many Taiwanese suspects have falsely confessed to a
crime they did not commit.
For researchers in Taiwan, there have been at least two
obstacles to empirical research in the field of false confessions. To
begin with, it is difficult to know for certain whether a contested
confession is truly false. However, in recent years, the use of DNA
identification technology—along with the resulting exoneration of
innocent prisoners has fortunately provided a major boost to
research on this issue by helping scholars identify scores of proven
false confessions to serious crimes.135 A second obstacle has been
the difficulty of studying false confessions in the laboratory setting.
A convincing laboratory simulation of a police interrogation would
require the researchers to induce certain levels of stress in
participants that would eventually violate ethical standards. Also,
the most important potential consequences of a false confession,
including a trial and prison sentence, cannot be fully simulated in
the laboratory setting. Although experimental research in this area
remains difficult, many laboratory studies in the United States have
contributed to our understanding of the psychology of interrogation
(such as revealing the perceptual biases that sometimes contribute to
wrongful convictions based on false confessions). 136 Future
research into the phenomenon of false confession in Taiwan should
focus on risk factors that could trigger police-induced false
confessions.
At the preliminary stage, researchers in Taiwan should make
use of the existing social science literature regarding false
confession in other countries.137 These studies provide Taiwanese
135

See TAIWAN YUANYU PINGFAN XIEHUI (台灣冤獄平反協會) [TAIWAN INNOCENCE
PROJECT], https://twinnocenceproject.org [https://perma.cc/L7NC-446N] (last visited Sept.
20, 2021).
136 Saul M. Kassin et al., I’d Know a False Confession If I Saw One: A Comparative
Study of College Students and Police Investigations, 29 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 211, 211–28
(2005).
137 For the use of social science knowledge in legal settings, see generally ELIZABETH
MERTZ, THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW (Elizabeth Mertz ed., 2008).
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policy makers a comprehensive review of police practices; laws
concerning the admissibility of confession evidence; and core
principles of psychology involving confessions. Researchers and
policy makers have come to realize the fundamental role that social
science studies can play in the understanding and prevention of
wrongful convictions. Among cases of wrongful conviction, the
most common reason has been eyewitness misidentification.
Researchers have succeeded at identifying the problems with
eyewitness misidentification and proposing concrete reforms. 138 In
1998, a committee of the American Psychology-Law Society
published a white paper reviewing the scientific evidence
concerning eyewitness identification and proposed rules for how
lineups and photo spreads should be conducted.139 Following this
white paper, the U.S. Department of Justice assembled a working
group of research psychologists, prosecutors, police officers, and
lawyers. Later, this group published guidelines for how law
enforcement agents can minimize eyewitness identification error. 140
Compared to the issues of eyewitness misidentifications, scientific
study of false confessions has come much later. It was not until
2010 that the U.S. DOJ published another white paper focusing on
the issues surrounding police-induced confession and summarized
what is known about false confession. 141 The paper also identified
suspect
characteristics,
interrogation
tactics,
and
the
phenomenology of innocence that influence confessions, as well as
the effects confessions have on judges and juries.142 This indicates
that scientific knowledge in the field of false confession has been
developed at a much slower pace compared to eyewitness
identification. For both Taiwan and the United States, it is
necessary to transfer the scientific knowledge of false confessions
from research laboratories to criminal justice practitioners.
The next question is the relevance of Miranda in the future
development of the rules of police interrogation. Using Taiwan as
138
BRIAN L. CUTLER, EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2009); PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION (Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al. eds., 1995).
139 Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for
Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1–39 (1998).
140 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A G UIDE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT (1999).
141 Kassin et al., supra note 7.
142 Id.
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an example, I propose a new approach to the Miranda jurisprudence
and confession laws. In particular, I propose three strategies: (1)
introducing expert testimony on false confession; (2) increasing
judicial scrutiny of the entire videotaped police-suspect interaction;
(3) and, changing the police culture. I begin my discussion with the
broader theoretical question: how important a role should Miranda
play?

IV.
A.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Standing at the Crossroads: The Future of Interrogation
Law

To construct a more adequate account of the Miranda
mechanism, it is imperative for us to recognize that discretion is
everywhere in the criminal justice system, even where the formal
law seems to preclude it. Police officials’ discretionary power
enables them great leeway to choose between options or craft—even
“conjure”—alternative arrangements. 143 Miranda warnings were
once believed to have transformed police interrogation from a
practice of inherent coercion to an occasion for suspects to express
their stories without fear. However, empirical research regarding
Miranda’s effects in the United States demonstrates that such a
notion was astonishingly naïve. Research has revealed that the
warnings lose most of their significance and protective power once
the interrogation begins. Once suspects agree to talk to the police,
they almost never call a halt to questioning or invoke their Miranda
rights.144 Moreover, once the interrogator issues the warnings and
secures the waiver, Miranda protections are almost irrelevant to

143 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
153–64 (1965) (discussing different methods of controlling the exercise of police
discretion). See also Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented
Approach, 25 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 236, 236–58 (1979) (proposing a new perspective of
the police function in which the police are committed, first and foremost, to respond to a
wide array of community problems).
144 See generally LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 7; THOMAS & LEO,
CONFESSIONS OF GUILT, supra note 5; THOMAS, supra note 5, at 1959–2000. See also
BAKER, supra note 8, at 407 (suggesting that Miranda’s major weakness is that it does not
require that a suspect first consult with a lawyer, or actually have a lawyer present, in order
for the waiver to be deemed valid).
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both the process and the outcome of the subsequent interrogation. 145
Any protections that Miranda might offer a suspect typically
evaporate as soon as the suspect provides a waiver and the
interrogation begins. Miranda may actually increase the suspect’s
bravado at the beginning of the interrogation, which, in fact, has the
effect of facilitating the interrogation. Once the police obtain a
waiver, the trickery and psychological coercion the Court originally
sought to address (along with new psychological techniques
developed since then) can still be used in the interrogation room.
As long as the police do not physically torture the suspects or
threaten them with immediate bodily harm, virtually any statements
made after a waiver can be used in court.
It is impossible to reflect on the impact of Miranda without
considering the functions of police questioning within a nation’s
criminal justice system and its society as a whole. As we consider
whether Miranda-like mechanisms could serve as the main
protections against false confessions, we should focus on the roles
of legal actors; the specific challenges facing a criminal justice
system; the society in which a system operates; and most
importantly, the capacity of a system to implement and enforce the
legal mandates.
The scope of Miranda reform in Taiwan has not resembled
the American practice since its inception. The Miranda mechanism
in the United States consists of not just the issuance of warnings. It
also includes regulations governing the timing of the warnings, the
warnings’ wording, the invocation and waiver of the rights, and the
exceptions to the warnings, to name just a few. To understand the
functioning of the Miranda mechanism, one needs to consider not
only the Court’s 1966 Miranda decision but also a series of postMiranda decisions. It is through these later decisions that the Court
dealt with issues including the meaning of “interrogation,” 146 the
meaning of “custodial interrogation,” 147 the waiver and invocation

145 Alschuler, supra note 9, at 859; Ferguson & Leo, supra note 7, at 937, 947–48;
Thomas & Leo, supra note 5, at 231–66.
146 See generally Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (discussing the meaning
of “interrogation” under Miranda).
147 See generally Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (discussing the meaning
of “custodial interrogation” under Miranda).
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of the rights, 148 the application of “the fruit of a poisonous tree”
doctrine, 149 “two-step” interrogations, 150 questioning “outside
Miranda,”151 and public safety exceptions.152 Any legal practitioner
in the United States will recognize the constancy and complexity of
the Miranda jurisprudence and Miranda-related motions.153 In short,
the Miranda jurisprudence in the United States is actually built on
multiple Court’s rulings.154
Taiwan, on the other hand, has a quite different experience.
Taiwan’s Miranda system was initially developed by the legislature
through Article 95 and Article 158-2 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.155 It was and still is unlikely that two articles could or
ever will be able to fully incorporate every aspect surrounding the
implementation of Miranda.
Therefore, continual judicial
intervention is essential for Taiwan’s Miranda system. The
Taiwanese judiciary has to be able to deal with all the remaining
questions surrounding Miranda. It must be able to instruct and
direct law enforcement agencies with clear rulings on these
questions. However, legal authority will not automatically affect
148 See generally Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (discussing waivers and
invocations of rights under Miranda). See also Leo & White, supra note 8, at 414–31.
149 See generally Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (discussing “the fruit of a
poisonous tree” doctrine under Miranda).
150 See generally United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (discussing “the twostep interrogations” procedure under Miranda). See also Leo & White, supra note 8, at
460–63.
151 See generally Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (discussing questioning
outside Miranda).
152 See generally New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (discussing public safety
exceptions under Miranda).
153 For example, the 21st edition of The Autobrief, a manual that helps California
prosecutors answer commonly encountered defense arguments, contains thirty-nine
arguments surrounding interrogation and confession. Among those arguments, thirty-one
are related to the Miranda. See THE AUTOBRIEF 21: AN AUTOMATED SYSTEM OF STANDARD
LEGAL ARGUMENTS FOR CALIFORNIA PROSECUTORS (Craig Fisher ed., 2016). In another
manual published to assist California practitioners on issues regarding confession, Miranda
rule occupies nine out of nineteen chapters. See VINCENT J. O’NEILL, JR., CALIFORNIA
CONFESSIONS LAW (2016). See also CALIFORNIA PEACE OFFICERS LEGAL SOURCEBOOK
(2015) (providing comprehensive summaries of Miranda-related case law for law
enforcement agencies).
154 For a discussion of the early development of Miranda jurisprudence, see O. John
Rogge, Confession and Self-Incrimination, in THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 77–80, 91–93
(Stuart S. Nagel ed., 1972). See also William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Taking
Miranda’s Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REV. 813, 844 (2005) (criticizing the doctrinal confusion
caused by the Miranda decision).
155 See supra note 25 and 29.
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police behavior. It needs a channel to be incorporated into police
decision-making processes. In routine policing, officers enjoy
considerable discretion because society does not want a rigid
application of rules, guidelines, or instructions to hinder the
discretion necessary for responsive action in particular, situations.
Police officers enjoy the power of policy making, in some sense,
because legislation and judicial rulings become empty words
without police cooperation. Moreover, internal police culture—
including ideas, values, language, expectations, and attitudes toward
the law and legal system as a whole 156—substantially affects how
officers exercise discretion. 157 Therefore, it is necessary to examine
the factors influencing police discretion so as to understand the realworld implementation of Miranda.
To help delineate Taiwan’s current situation, it is worthwhile
to examine another comparative perspective. Social science
literature in the United States shows that police officers largely
follow the instructions of interrogation training manuals. One of the
major findings is that current police training has undermined the
effectiveness of a system of warnings and waivers. 158 However,
such training appears to be largely consistent with the views of the
Court and lower courts’ rulings. Most of the current training
manuals legitimately encourage police officers to make use of the
advantages the Court has given to police. The trickiest problem for
156 See generally Sharon Hays, Structure and Agency and the Sticky Problem of
Culture, 12 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 57, 65 (1994) (defining culture as “a social, durable,
layered pattern of cognitive and normative system that are . . . embedded in behavior,
passed about in interaction, internalized in personalities, and externalized in institutions”);
BENJAMIN LE WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY (MIT Press 1956) (examining
the contribution of language structure to understanding the way speakers in different
cultures think about and approach the practicalities of social life).
157 See, e.g., Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian
Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611, 613–14, 666 (2016) (suggesting that police culture
“too often flatly refuses to acknowledge systemic factors that contribute to misconduct and
castigates any form of criticism as misplaced, uninformed, and affirmatively dangerous to
offices and communities”). See also LARRY KRASNER, FOR THE PEOPLE: A STORY OF
JUSTICE AND POWER 180 (2021) (suggesting that cultural change is required in reforming
the criminal justice system); JONATHAN RAPPING, GIDEON’S PROMISE: A PUBLIC DEFENDER
MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM CRIMINAL JUSTICE 82–84 (2020) (describing the importance of
cultural change in reforming public defenders’ offices).
158 See Kassin et al., supra note 7, at 6–7; Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 1529–37. But
see Joseph P. Buckley, CLARIFYING MISREPRESENTATIONS ABOUT LAW ENFORCEMENT
INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES (JOHN E. REID AND ASSOCIATES, INC. 2020) (reacting to
criticisms of the Reid technique).
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the U.S. Miranda system is not how to end interrogation practices
that are contrary to the rulings of the Court. Instead, the doctrinal
structure of Miranda and the real-world evolution of police
interrogation basically work together. The training manuals are
generally faithful to judicial opinions regarding the timing and
content of the warnings, as well as the implied waiver and
invocation doctrines. 159 Thus, the pattern of the U.S. model is that
as police officers exercise discretion in interrogation practices they
generally consult training manuals, which, in turn, successfully
transmit judicial rulings.
Unlike the practices in the United States, in Taiwan police
training and training manuals do not serve the function of
transmitting judicial opinions into practice(s). 160 Most police
officers I encountered in Taiwan do not read legal documents or
actively follow the latest legislation or judicial decisions. 161 The
official training mechanism is thus critical for providing police
officers with such information. 162 However, most training simply
159

Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 1592.
The most widely used interrogation manual is Interrogation Practices written by
Zhuang Zhong-Jin, who is an instructor at the Taiwan Police College. The manual was first
used as part of the course material for “Police Interrogation Practices” at the Taiwan Police
College. It was later published by the Taiwan Police College in 2011. See ZHUANG ZHONGJIN (莊忠 進), ZHENXUN SHIWU ( 偵訊 實務) [INTERROGATION PRACTICES] (2011). This
manual is important for a number of reasons. With a forward by the minister of the Interior
and the director of the National Policy Agency, the manual was described as “the milestone
for the teaching of police interrogation.” From the opening pages, the author describes the
manual’s goal as aiming to make police interrogation more transparent so that the public
will come to respect and trust the police. The manual also serves to help establish police
interrogation as a process that focuses on truth finding and human rights protections.
Chapter 2 of the manual discusses the problem of illegitimate interrogation techniques. It
argues that torture, threat, inducement, fraud, exhausting questioning or other improper
means should not be used because these methods undermine the goal of eliciting truthful
confessions and getting convictions. The manual enumerates seventeen basic psychological
interrogation techniques and strategies that are later be repeated and elaborated by
numerous other police training manuals.
161 Fieldnote 40:02 (notes on file with the author); Interview 12:02 (notes on file with
the author).
162 Zhuang’s manual elaborates the existing regulations in the Code of Criminal
Procedure. It seeks to educate police officers about the changing, and rather complicated,
law of criminal procedure that regulates police interrogation. It has, by far, the most
detailed descriptions of the laws regulating the interrogation process and the numerous
legal issues generated by the Miranda legislations. In the section on “Miranda Warnings,”
the manual suggests that the interrogator make use of the standardized Miranda warnings
provided in the attachment to the manual. It also distinguishes different kinds of suspects
and different process. When the suspect is mentally handicapped or aborigine, the manual
160
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restates the existing statutes or basic official instructions given by
the National Police Agency. Nor does training provide interrogators
with practical guidelines or judicial interpretations.
My
examination of the currently circulated interrogation manuals and
subsequent interviews with police officers reveals that police
officers in Taiwan do not give much credit to official interrogation
training.163 They believe that formal education training and on-thesuggests that after the initial warnings and suspects decide not to appoint defense counsel,
the interrogator should still contact the Legal Aid Foundation and request free counsel for
the suspect. On the other hand, if the suspect is from a low-income household or a near
poor household, the interrogator only needs to inform the suspect that he/she may request
defense counsel for free. In the latter case, the manual informs interrogators that they do
not need to contact the Legal Aid Foundation if the suspect waives his/her right to defense
counsel. In addition, Chapter 8 of the manual focuses on preparing an interrogation record.
The manual breaks the process down into four stages: inquiry of the identity, procedure
requirement, substantive questioning, and general overview. Providing the Miranda
warnings constitutes the main element of the procedural requirement. The manual proposes
several changes in the existing standardized interrogation template in order to conform to
the latest amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since typing the interrogation
records are now computer-based, the manual suggests that interrogators first provide oral
Miranda warnings and then print out the standardized Miranda warning form for the
suspects to sign. The interrogators should confirm with the suspect that he/she understood
the content of the Miranda rights. Another important issue discussed in the manual is the
timing of the Miranda warnings. It is clear that before conducting formal interrogations
police officers are required to provide the Miranda warnings. However, the Code of
Criminal Procedure does not make clear whether or not police officers should give the
Miranda warnings when putting the suspect into custody. The manual suggests that police
officers should provide oral Miranda warnings when making an arrest, since any
subsequent communication between police officers and the suspect will be the functional
equivalent of interrogation. However, the manual also emphasizes that it is not legally
required for the police officers to provide the Miranda warnings after arrest. Therefore, the
manual tells police officers that it is not necessary to inquire whether or not Miranda
warnings were provided at the initial arrest. So long as Miranda warnings are provided
prior to formal interrogation the subsequent confession will admissible, regardless of
whether or not the original offices also provided warnings. Finally, the manual suggests
police officers use a “confirmation procedure.” After the oral Miranda warnings and the
suspect signs the standardized Miranda warning form, the interrogator should ask the
following questions: “Did the police officer inform you of the above rights?” and “Do you
want to retain defense counsel?”
163 Another widely used interrogation manual is HE ZHAO-FAN (何招凡), ZHENXUN YU
YISONG SHIWU (偵訊與移送實務) [INVESTIGATION AND INTERROGATION PRACTICES] (2014)
This training manual is originally used in a seminar on interrogation psychology at the
Central Police University. The highlight of this training manual is its inclusion of many
interrogation theories and techniques from foreign countries, especially those adopted by
law enforcement officers in the United States. The first part of the manual provides police
officers the principle for conducting interrogation. The author of the manual attempts to
establish a scientific basis for police interrogation that focuses on educating police officers
about the behavioral methods of lie detection and the psychology of interrogation from a
comparative legal prospective. The manual repeats many of the same techniques that are
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job training do not provide them with useful interrogation strategies
and techniques. Such circumstances generate what I called the state
of “legal void” in which legal authorities, such as legislative and
judicial decisions, have not been accurately transmitted to police
officers through training.164 It further indicates that police officers
discussed in Zhuang’s Interrogation Practices. The second part of the manual consists of
sixty-three sample interrogation templates. It provides police officers with the basic
structure of interrogation, the main questions to be asked, and commentaries from the
prosecutors. The third part of the manual includes two case studies. These focus on how
the techniques mentioned in the manual were used to solve real cases. Investigation and
Interrogation Practices reflects the ideology of police interrogation that seeks to replace
previous practices of torture with psychological interrogation methods. This training
manual serves several functions for the police. First, the manual educates police officers
about legally appropriate and inappropriate interrogation techniques. It defines the
professional standards of interrogation. Second, it teaches police officers psychological
methods of interrogation. The main theme of the manual is that psychological methods are
far more effective at eliciting truthful confessions than traditional physical torture. Third,
citing the training manuals in the United States, the author argues that psychological
methods, unlike torture, could not induce an innocent person to confess falsely. Finally,
Investigation and Interrogation Practices is the only training manual that provides police
officers with practical instructions regarding interrogation. The interrogation templates
involve six different kinds of crime and provide junior police officers useful guidance.
However, issues related to the Miranda warnings are not the primary focus of this training
manual. It only restates the existing regulations and incorporates the statutes’ language into
the interrogation templates. Similar to Zhuang’s Interrogation Practices, the manual
suggests interrogators ask two further questions before asking substantive questions: “Do
you understand the above rights?” and “Do you want to retain defense counsel?”
164 Some training materials in Taiwan have tried to introduce U.S.-oriented
interrogation techniques. But those materials did not attract wide attention among rankand-file officers. For instance, Gao ZHONG-YI (高忠義), XINGSHI Z HENXUN CONGSHU (刑
事偵訊叢書) [THE COLLECTION OF INTERROGATION TRAINING] (2009) is used as course
material in the advanced education program at the Central Police University. The lecturer
of the seminar divided the course into seventeen sections, focusing on the introduction of
various interrogation techniques developed in foreign legal practices. The first part of the
manual translates and summarizes the techniques proposed in the Inbau & Reid manual
and other training manuals. It offers police a nine-step psychological process that
emphasizes a sequential logic of influence and persuasion. The manual states that
interrogation is a lengthy and repetitive process in which the interrogator should establish
psychological control over the suspect and gradually elicit a confession by raising the
suspect’s anxiety levels while simultaneously lowering the perceived consequences of
confessing. See FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 183–
441 (2013). The manual concludes that successful interrogation can encourage most
suspects to waive Miranda rights, regardless of whether or not they are actually guilty. The
author believes this is because some suspects are actually innocent and are eager to share
their side of the story. However, most of the time, it is because suspects know intuitively
that asking for a lawyer is tantamount to admitting guilt, and they believe that relying on
the right to remain silent is almost a clear admission of guilt. No matter what, the manual
instructs interrogators do not violate the Miranda rulings based on the false assumption
that the warnings will thwart the police and encourage the suspects to refuse to answer.
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need to rely on other informal channels (such as the mentorship
system) to help them execute their discretion.
In short, Taiwanese Miranda reform is largely incomplete in
the sense that judicial opinions and legislations leave many
Miranda-related questions unanswered. For future reforms related
to police interrogation and false confessions, Taiwan is left with two
options. On the one hand, Taiwan can further develop its Miranda
jurisprudence and implement it strictly. In order to do that, multiple
topics will need to be fully addressed: (1) what is the content of a
valid advisement; (2) at what stage will the Miranda protection be
attached (the custody requirement); (3) what types of encounters
between police officers and suspects qualify as interrogation; (4)
shall the Miranda rule apply only to interrogation conducted by law
enforcement officials (the state action requirement); (5) what are the
exceptions of the Miranda rule; (6) what counts as a valid waiver
and invocation of the Miranda rule; (7) the legitimacy of reinterview after waiver, invocation, or violation of the Miranda
rights; (8) shall special rules apply to the interrogation of
juveniles.165 If the content of the Taiwanese Miranda rule is fully
elaborated, it could be expected that more litigations will follow.
On the other hand, Taiwan can leave Miranda as it is and
move on to a search for alternative solutions without abandoning it
entirely. For the following reasons, I argue that Taiwan should
embrace this approach:
To begin with, the U.S. experience illustrates that police
have successfully adapted to Miranda. Following an initial
adjustment period, police have learned how to comply with
Miranda and still elicit confessions from suspects. Because police
have learned how to “work” Miranda to their advantage, such
protections exert minimal restraint on police, contrary to the
intentions of the Warren Court. 166 The Taiwanese judiciary and
legislature could try to the consolidate the Miranda as “law on the
165

See, e.g., Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An
Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1154 (1980) (finding that the majority of
juveniles who received Miranda warnings did not understand them well enough to waive
their rights); THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVERS OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 106–07 (1981) (reporting that only about half of midadolescents understand the Miranda warning).
166 Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 1588–99; Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall
(?) of Miranda, 87 WASH. L. REV. 965, 967–70 (2012).
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books” and hope that the “law in action” will comply with their
original goals. But this is a long shot.
Second, the implementation of the Miranda in the United
States has caused an “unintended consequence.” Besides displacing
de facto the case-by-case voluntariness standard as the primary test
of the admissibility of a confession, the Miranda jurisprudence has
shifted courts’ analysis from the voluntariness of a confession to the
voluntariness of a Miranda waiver. As long as police have
informed the suspects of their Miranda rights and secured a waiver,
courts will often minimize the scrutiny afforded interrogation
practices following a waiver. 167 Once police have received a
Miranda waiver, the defendants bear a heavy burden to establish
that the confession was involuntary and should be excluded. In
short, Miranda not only offers little protection against coercive
interrogation, but it may have further weakened the existing
safeguards by shifting the courts’ focus from whether the
interrogation process was coercive to whether the police follow
Miranda protocol.168
Third, Taiwan’s Miranda system has not followed the same
pattern of development as in the United States. Precisely unlike in
the United States, police officers in Taiwan do not use Miranda
warnings to calm and reassure the suspect into waiving the rights at
the outset of the interrogation. As I have shown in previous sections
of this Article, police officers in Taiwan systematically create an
underground interrogation process. During the pre-interrogation
interaction, police officers question suspects and seek to secure
incriminating statements from them. The “formal” Miranda
warnings do not have any significant role to play during this
interaction. The warnings only have symbolic value, indicating that
the “legal drama” of formal interrogation will begin during the
front-stage.169 The irrelevance of Miranda occurs not only during
police interrogation, but the Taiwanese courts also almost never
consider the Miranda waiver as a safe harbor for interrogator. The
voluntary test and the due process test remain the dominate
standards for the admissibility of the suspect’s statements. The
167

Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confession, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051,
1092–94 (2010).
168 LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 7; Thomas & Leo, supra note 5, at 231–66.
169 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865,
883 (1981) (asserting that “Miranda undoubtedly serves important symbolic functions”).
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irrelevance of Miranda in Taiwan actually provides an opportunity
for the courts to continue develop the jurisprudence of the voluntary
test and the due process clause. Moving past the “Miranda fantasy”
would cost relatively little for Taiwan and is the most promising
way toward the reform of police interrogation practices.
Miranda probably does work, but imperfectly, and better
under some conditions than others. I believe that Taiwan probably
could get along fine without trusting in the Miranda protections, and
certainly without believing that Miranda could ever work perfectly.
The idea that “Of course Miranda doesn’t work perfectly, but we
have to find better ways to improve it” causes us to engage in the
messy task of assessing when Miranda instructions are most likely
to work, how Miranda can be made more effective, and what should
follow from a recognition that Miranda works only so well. Such
an approach spares us the important task of accessing other
potentially more effective alternatives. So, from a cost- benefit
perspective, we should at least leave Miranda as the status quo and
start pondering the question: besides reimagining or reintegrating
Miranda, where can we go and how can we move on? In the
following sections, I try to provide some possible, realistic
alternatives.
B.
(a)

Using Expert Testimony
The Knowledge Transfer Function

Many researchers in the United States discuss the
relationship between police interrogation tactics and false
confessions. 170 We now have a large body of academic studies
regarding false confession, including its causes and effects. 171 This
knowledge must be transferred from the academic community to the
170

Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Confession Evidence, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S.
Wrightsman eds.) 67, 76 (1985) (identifying three types of false confessions, a taxonomy
still universally accepted today). But see Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social
Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False
Confessions, 16 STUD. L., POL. & SOC. 189, 207–10 (1997) (criticizing Kassin and
Wrightsman’s classification and proposing a revised categorization).
171 See, e.g., Sara C. Appleby et al., Police-Induced Confessions: An Empirical
Analysis of Their Content and Impact, PSYCHOLOGY, CRIME & LAW 1 (2011); Davis & Leo,
supra note 114.
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criminal justice one. Transferring academic understandings of
police-induced false confession to legal practices can be
accomplished in many ways, including legislative action, and
training for law enforcement investigators, attorneys, and judges.
One common reform proposal is to drastically change police
interrogation practices to prevent false confessions. However, there
are problems with relying on training officers in alternative methods
to end false confessions. For example, budgets for training are
normally quite meager, while educational standards vary widely
across particular law-enforcement agencies. These agencies often
have limited research capabilities, especially in the areas of social
and behavioral science needed for providing alternative
investigation practices and evidence-based approaches.
Providing expert testimony to factfinders during trial is
another critical mechanism for knowledge transfer. 172 As wrongful
convictions have become more widely recognized as problems
confronting the criminal justice system, policy makers have
struggled with finding effective mechanisms to prevent such
errors.173 One solution has been an increasing number of attempts
to introduce expert witness testimony in cases with disputed
172

For the use of expert witness testimony in areas of interrogations and confessions,
see generally Mark Costanzo et al., Juror Beliefs About Police Interrogations, False
Confessions, and Expert Testimony, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 231, 233–34 (2010); Iris
Blandon-Gitlin et al., Jurors Believe Interrogation Tactics Are Not Likely to Elicit False
Confessions: Will Expert Witness Testimony Inform Them Otherwise?, PSYCH., CRIME &
LAW 1, 3–4 (2010); Saul M. Kassin, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and
Implications for Reform, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 249, 252 (2008); Kassin,
supra note 132, at 44; Richard A. Leo & Brittany Liu, What Do Potential Jurors Know
About Police Interrogation Techniques and False Confessions?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 381,
397 (2009); LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 7, at 314–16; Nadia Soree, When the
Innocent Speak: False Confessions, Constitutional Safeguards, and the Role of Expert
Testimony, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191 (2005). See also Morgan S. Moffa & Judith Platania,
Effects of Expert Testimony and Interrogation Tactics on Perceptions of Confessions, 100
PSYCH. REP. 563 (2007) (investigating the effect of expert witness testimony on mock
jurors’ perceptions of a confession).
173
For the problem of mass wrongful conviction in the criminal justice system, see,
e.g., NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S
LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 185–86 (2016). See also Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives:
Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 129–33 (1998)
(discussing how there are likely thousands of undiscovered wrongful convictions just in
death row); Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful
Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1158–63 (2005) (discussing how once the legal
process against an innocent suspect begins, it is unlikely to be derailed due to the minimum
standards set forth to maintain a prosecution).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol17/iss1/2

2022]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

57

confessions or problematic interrogation practices. It is suggested
that expert testimony assist factfinders understand the phenomenon
of false confession by displacing the intuitive misconception that a
person would not succumb to pressure and falsely confess174 Such
testimony
addresses matters beyond an ordinary person’s
knowledge, and, in many cases, reveals reality to be contrary to
one’s “common-sense” intuition.175 Expert witnesses can serve as
educators in a range of knowledge-transfer contexts. For example,
they may educate the factfinder, and the court generally, about
psychology, and how it might be applied to their evaluation of the
confession evidence in the case at hand.
Furthermore, the systemic study of false confessions was
developed in academic research laboratories, instead of as the
product of law enforcement agencies studying the effectiveness of
their interrogation practices. Much of the responsibility for
scientific research and development has fallen to academics.
Additionally, there are simply very few collaborative projects
between academics and law enforcement. It would be beneficial
and efficient if comprehensive research and systemic evaluation of
false confessions could be conducted inside the criminal justice
system.
However, no effective research and development
organization embedded within the criminal justice system in either
Taiwan or in the United States has evaluated the issues surrounding
false confessions addressed by academic research. The way in
which law enforcement holds onto confrontational interrogation
techniques is based on a commitment to customary (yet
questionable) knowledge and a rejection of scientific findings. 176
174
Saul M. Kassin et al., On the General Acceptance of Confessions Research:
Opinions of the Scientific Community, 73 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 63 (2018) (surveying
eighty-seven confession experts worldwide and indicating areas of high consensus suitable
175
for expert testimony).
See LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 7, at
314–15 (discussing how expert witness testimony educates triers of fact about social
scientific research on interrogation and confession which helps them make a more accurate
judgement regarding the reliability of confessions).
175 See LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 7, at 314–15 (discussing how expert
witness testimony educates triers of fact about social scientific research on interrogation
and confession which helps them make a more accurate judgement regarding the reliability
of confessions).
176 See Eli Hager, The Seismic Change in Police Interrogations, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT (Mar. 07, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/03/07/the-seismicchange-in-police-interrogations [https://perma.cc/52M2-XN43] (reporting that multiple
police departments have decided not to train their officers using the Reid technique
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The Taiwanese and American criminal justice systems have
allocated to academics the work of developing and using scientific
knowledge to evaluate and improve demonstrably flawed
interrogation techniques, rather than bringing scientific knowledge
into the criminal justice system.
In short, before scientific knowledge regarding false
confessions becomes a routine part of law enforcement, it is
necessary to find other solutions for making the knowledge gained
through the social sciences available to police agencies and the
courts. Expert testimony can serve as an effective way to fill this
“knowledge gap.”
(b)

The Development and Content of Expert Testimony
Regarding False Confessions177

On December 10, 1984, U.C. Berkeley student Bradley Page
falsely confessed to murdering Bibi Lee and to the later rape of her
dead body. Bradley Page was led to falsely confess in the usual
way—through an unconscionably long police interrogation in which
he was isolated, relentlessly accused of having killed his lover,
made to feel guilty and distressed, and lied to (about why he was
there, the nature of evidence against him, his interrogators’ motives
and intentions, and what would happen to him if he refused to
confess). 178 Unlike countless false confessors before him, Page
soon turned to an expert on social influence to explain to the trial
jury how police interrogation tactics could influence a person of
normal intelligence and mental health to falsely confess to such a
because research and exonerations over the years have shown that it can lead to false
confessions). See also Kassin, supra note 172, at 250–51 (discussing police interrogation
tactics that may cause innocent people to confess); Douglas Starr, The Interview: Do
Police Interrogation Techniques Produce False Confessions?, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 01,
2013),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/09/the-interview-7
[https://perma.cc/2953-4M2C] (discussing the fallibility police interrogation techniques,
particularly the Reid technique, that are commonly used to generate confessions);
Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 1530–31 (suggesting that the Reid technique is “widespread,
if not pervasive”).
177 The following analysis of expert testimony is primarily based on my conversations
with eight scholars who have regularly served as expert witnesses (notes on file with the
author).
178 Deborah Davis, Lies, Damned Lies, and the Path from Police Interrogation to
Wrongful Conviction, in THE SCIENTIST AND THE HUMANIST: A FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF
ELLIOT ARONSON 211 (Marti Hope Gonzalez et al., ed., 2010).
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heinous crime. Thus, on March 30, 1988, Elliot Aronson, then
teaching at U.C. Santa Cruz, became the first psychologist in the
United States to testify as an expert witness on the causes of false
confession.
As described by Deborah Davis and Saul M. Kassin, 1988,
the year Aronson testified in court––was the dawn of what later
became widespread interest in false confessions among
psychologists. Though there had been several previous analyses of
police-induced false confessions, experimental studies of the
phenomenon had only just begun around the time of Page’s (false)
confession. Many of the early studies focused on the issues of
individual vulnerability to interrogative influence and the effects of
confession evidence on juror reactions. It was not until the early
1990s that experimental tests on the ability of interrogation tactics
to promote false confession finally began, and only after that was
the first experimental study published. 179 At the time of Page’s trial,
an experimental science of police-induced false confession did not
exist. Consequently, it is worth emphasizing that Aronson’s
testimony only included how the already scientifically documented
principles of social influence might apply to Page’s interrogation. 180
In the two decades since Aronson’s testimony, social science
has provided increasingly sophisticated analyses of police
interrogation tactics, along with experimental tests of the influences
of these tactics. 181 Meanwhile, a series of DNA exonerations has
179 See Kassin & Kiechel, supra note 126 (conducting the first ethical laboratory
paradigm for experimentation on false confessions).
180 In Page’s case, the judge ruled that because he had never been in a police
interrogation room, he was not allowed to testify, in any detail, about the interrogation
itself—which meant that Aronson could not make the linkage between certain aspects of
the interrogation with social psychology experiments. Aronson later remarked that: “I am
convinced that this decision made a huge difference because the jury had a hard time
digesting the importance of the social psychology experiments in the absence of my being
able to spell it out for them . . . .That issue still haunts me.” Fieldnote 23:03 (notes on file
with the author).
181
See, e.g., Davis, supra note 178, at 218–19; Miriam Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False
Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation
Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 791 (2006); Saul M. Kassin & Gisli Gudjonsson, The
Psychology of Confession: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCH. SCI. IN THE PUB.
INT. 35 (2004); Saul M. Kassin et al., Behavior Confirmation in the Interrogation Room:
On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 187 (2003); Saul M. Kassin
& Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions: Communicating Promises and
Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233 (1991); Saul M. Kassin &
Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The Power of Innocence,
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highlighted the role of false confession in proven wrongful
convictions.182 This has resulted in increasing awareness of the role
of false confessions in the criminal justice system, and an
exponential increase in legal and scientific publications examining
the causes of false confessions.183 Such a development has fueled
the growth of social science experts providing expert testimony on
interrogation-induced false confessions in the United States. Many
of the experts I interviewed pointed out that, although today’s
experts tend to testify to many of the same causes of false
confession as Aronson did in 1988, the scientific basis of their
testimony has vastly expanded.184
The general role of expert witnesses in cases involving a
potentially false confession is to educate the jury or judge about the
process and tactics of interrogation and the psychological factors
that might lead a suspect to falsely confess.185 When an objective
record of the interrogation exists, the expert can review that record.
28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211 (2004); Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions
and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
27 (1997); Jennifer T. Perillo & Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation: The Lie, The Bluff,
and False Confession, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 327 (2011).
182 According to the Innocence Project, the false confessions of innocents are a known
contributing factor in approximately 29% of all DNA exoneration cases. See DNA
Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/DNAEXONERATIONS-IN-THE-UNITED-STATES/ [https://perma.cc/KHE7-VU8D] (last
visited Oct. 24, 2021). See also Drizin & Leo, supra note 108 (discussing how DNA tests
have exonerated numerous individuals who gave false confessions); LEO, POLICE
INTERROGATION, supra note 7, at 239–40 (stating how DNA testing has proven wrongful
convictions in “scores of cases,” and discussing that in a study of twenty-eight wrongful
convictions exonerated via DNA testing, eighteen percent were attributable to false
confessions); DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
161–62 (2012) (discussing a study that found that jurors believed three out of every four
false confessions).
183 Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 170, at 63–65 (providing a historical overview
on the scientific study of police interrogations and confessions).
184 Fieldnote 23:04 (notes on file with the author).
185 Several courts have ruled on the admissibility of expert testimony about false
confession. Such a decision is entrusted to the discretion of a trial court judge pursuant to
the rules governing the admissibility of scientific and expert testimony. See U.S. v. Benally,
541 F.3d 990 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that as long as the trial court applied the correct
legal standard regarding admissibility expert testimony, the appellate court only reviews
for abuse of discretion); State v. Wright, 247 S.W.3d 161 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that
it is generally within the trial court’s discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony);
Boyer v. State, 825 So. 2d 418 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that the trial court does
have initial discretion, but if expert testimony goes to the “heart” of the case, then the jury
is entitled to hear it).
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Experts are generally permitted to offer an analysis of which factors
may be present in the specific confession being considered by the
court. Oftentimes, it is the duty of the expert witness to assist the
factfinder by pointing out what factors should be considered when
evaluating the reliability of a confession so that the jury can decide
how much weight should be assigned to the confession. Many of
the experts I interviewed endorse the use of responsible expert
testimony on interrogation practices and the psychology of false
confession. In fact, in recent years, a number of scholars have
called for the use of expert testimony. 186 There is now a wellaccepted body of social science study on this topic. The use of
expert testimony in cases involving disputed interrogation practices
or confession has become increasingly common.
In sum, it serves the interest of justice to present social
science research on the psychology of police interrogation, coercion,
and false confession to judges and jurors. Absent the educational
effect of expert testimony, judges and jurors may simply accept a
confession without considering whether it may be coerced and
false. 187 Failure to allow expert testimony may contribute to the
erroneous conviction and incarceration of an innocent person.188
186

See generally supra note 172.
See, e.g., Costanzo et al., supra note 172, at 240–42 (reporting that the majority of
jurors find expert testimony helpful regarding why innocent people might confess to a
crime). See also Kassin & Sukel, supra note 181, at 43 (finding that mock jurors voted to
convict the defendant even when the judge admonished the jury to disregard the coerced
confession); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Coerced Confessions, Judicial
Instruction, and Mock Juror Verdicts, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 489 (1981) (reporting
that jury instructions might not be an effective mechanism for the jury to disregard coerced
confessions).
188
In fact, the use of expert testimony in the area of false confession has been even
more important after the passage of the Citizen Judges Act (國民法官法) in 2020. This
new “mixed panel” system will come into effect in 2023. It will allow citizen participation
in criminal trial rulings on certain selected crimes. Verdicts will be decided by a panel
comprising three professional judges and six lay judges. This legislation marks a new era
for Taiwan’s criminal justice system. Two main reasons were given to justify the creation
of greater lay participation in Taiwan. First, it was believed that lay participation would
produce better criminal justice by ensuring that court decisions reflect citizens’ experiences.
Second, allowing civilian participation would promote the democratic values, make the
criminal justice system more responsive to Taiwanese society’s needs, and further increase
the legitimacy of criminal court decisions. See Fawubu Quanguo Fagui Ziliaoku: Guomin
Faguan Fa ( 法 務 部 全 國 法 規 資 料 庫 : 國 民 法 官 法 ) [Ministry of Justice Laws and
Regulations Database of the Republic of China: Citizen Judges Act], at
https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0030320 [https://perma.cc/T4EF2FQ7] (last visited Sept. 20, 2021). For the earlier effort to introduce a lay judge system in
187
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Concerns Regarding the Practices of Expert Testimony

The vast majority of case law in the United States supports
the admissibility of expert testimony in false confession settings. 189
Although there have been a few cases in which courts have not
permitted expert testimony, they are exceptional. 190 However,
social psychologists have testified in hundreds of criminal and civil
trials that have generated no written opinions. Both Kassin and
Thomas Grisso pointed out that expert witnesses now testify on
various issues concerning false confession. 191 It is critical to
document the content and scientific basis of their testimony. Such
data will help policy makers develop better regulations for the
practice of expert testimony.
Specifically, experts come from different backgrounds.
Some are from academic settings while others come from private
settings. Importantly, we do not have enough empirical data
regarding how they might testify differently. According to Grisso,
if one makes his/her living through expert testimony, it is expected
that the quality of the testimony may be affected by financial
incentives. 192 Thus, there are at least two advantages to experts
from academic settings. To begin with, these experts have financial
support from their universities or research institutions, so they do
not rely on the number of cases in which they testify for income.
Take Kassin as an example. He indicated that he seldom testifies in
Taiwan, see RIEKO KAGE, WHO JUDGES? DESIGNING JURY SYSTEMS IN JAPAN, EAST ASIA,
AND EUROPE 138–53 (2017); Margaret K. Lewis, Who Shall Judge? Taiwan’s Exploration
of Lay Participation in Criminal Trials, in TAIWAN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
437 (Jerome A. Cohen et al., eds., 2019). See also Dimitri Vanoverbeke & Hiroshi Fukurai,
Lay Participation in the Criminal Trial in Japan A Decade of Activity and Its
Sociopolitical Consequences, in JURIES, LAY JUDGES, AND MIXED COURTS: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE (Sanja Kutnjak Ivković et al., eds, 2021) 69, 69–71 (discussing the growing
public concerns about wrongful convictions in Japan and the diminishing public trust in the
criminal justice system that eventually led to the development of the Law on the
Participation of Lay Judges in the Criminal Procedure).
189
See, e.g., Vent v. State, 67 P.3d 661 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (stating that various
courts have upheld the admissibility of false confession expert testimony).
190 Danielle E. Chojnacki et al., An Empirical Basis for the Admission of Expert
Testimony on False Confession, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 45 (2008) (“Courts . . . often exclude
expert testimony on false confessions, holding that such topics are already within the
common knowledge of the average juror and therefore would not assist the jury in
evaluating the reliability and credibility of the confession.”).
191 Fieldnote 24:02 (notes on file with the author).
192 Fieldnote 24:03 (notes on file with the author).
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court nowadays. Given his position as a professor, he can be
selective when choosing the cases in which he will testify. He will
only testify when he believes that the case will set a precedent in
that jurisdiction. Instead, he refers the cases to other experts he
trusts.193 There is the potential danger that those who testify for a
living may simply say whatever is favorable to one side. If one’s
livelihood depends on the amount of testimony given, one will be
more inclined to provide “helpful” testimony and be subject to bias.
Interestingly, Aronson told me that he no longer testifies in court
since he does not want to become such a “hired gun.”194 In the last
few years before his retirement from testifying, he only chose cases
that he believed had a truly innocent defendant. Yet other
professionals do not have the same privilege as Kassin and Aronson
to decline opportunities to provide expert testimony.
Another advantage of experts from an academic setting is
that their research goes hand in hand with the quality of their
testimony. Frequently, experts will use their own assessment
instruments to empirically assess various aspects of false confession.
Their credibility and expertise are thus less likely to be challenged
in court. Many of the experts I interviewed told me that they only
testify on the particular issues on which they feel more comfortable
providing their opinions.
This resembles the process of
professionalization. However, as Grisso observed, we cannot overgeneralize as to such a claim. There are many experts from
academic settings who testify on virtually every issue surrounding
false confession, including individual vulnerability, police
interrogation techniques, Miranda comprehension, and numerous
other risk factors. Some may be motivated by financial incentives,
others may be eager to build their reputations, and yet still others
may simply want to “change the world.” So, there clearly could be
a potential quality issue that needs to be considered even with
witnesses from academic settings. 195
In sum, expert testimony becomes more complicated and
often involves multiple empirical assessments with the development
of social science research on false confession. 196 What are the
193

Fieldnote 25:04 (notes on file with the author).
Fieldnote 23:07 (notes on file with the author).
195 Fieldnote 24:05 (notes on file with the author).
196 See, e.g., Deborah Davis & Richard A. Leo, To Walk in Their Shoes: The Problem
of Missing, Misunderstood, and Misrepresented Context in Judging Criminal Confessions,
194
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backgrounds of these experts? What kind of professional training
have they received? How often do they testify? Do their
testimonies rely on credible assessment instruments?
More
importantly, how do we guarantee the impartiality of experts,
especially when they have a strong incentive to favor one party?
Without official records of their opinions, there is no way we can
properly answer these questions.
In fact, in addition to examining the rules governing police
interrogation and the admissibility of confession, policy makers in
Taiwan have started considering other possible interventions that
are designed to allow more accurate assessment of the reliability of
confessions, such as admitting expert testimony to help educate
judges about the existence of false confessions and contributing
factors.197 It is suggested that a comprehensive database should be
developed in order to better promote and regulate the practices of
expert testimony in the field of false confession.
C.

Videotaping the Entire Police-Suspect Interaction

Expert testimony is necessary because adversarial
proceedings are not sufficient to protect innocent individuals against
the likelihood of wrongful conviction. The core purpose of expert
testimony is to educate judges and juries about the findings of
scientific research about interrogation and confession. Such
testimony helps the triers of fact understand the psychological
principles, practices, and processes of modern interrogation so they
can better discriminate between reliable and unreliable confessions.
However, expert testimony may better assist the factfinders
only when there is a complete record of interrogation. According to
Aronson, a major barrier for his testimony in Page’s case was the
lack of a full recording of the two crucial sections of Page’s
interrogation: the polygraph session and the interrogation that
followed. Therefore, he had to rely on the less informative
recordings of the sessions preceding the polygraph and the
recording of the confession after it had been shaped by the later
stage of the interrogation.198 The only interrogation record available
46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 737 (2012) (reviewing studies regarding the psychological processes
linking false confessions to wrongful conviction).
197 Interview 69:09 (notes on file with the author).
198 Fieldnote 23:04 (notes on file with the author).
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to him was the recording of interviews with the prosecutor, where
Page explained how and why he developed and recounted his false
story. Since the subsequent accounts of Page and the detectives
differed with respect to what happened during the interrogation, no
indisputable record of the police’s tactics existed. What else would
Aronson add into his testimony if he had had a complete transcript
of Page’s interrogation? What other deceptions do interrogators
employ? How do such lies and misdirection continue to affect a
suspect after he/she confessed?
Relevance is one threshold for the admissibility of an expert
testimony. In the absence of factual basis of individual case
supporting the analysis, an expert might only be able to provide
broad statements that a particular psychiatric diagnosis or
interrogation technique is consistent with a false-confession claim.
In fact, without a full record of the interrogation process, the court
might look unfavorably on sweeping expert testimony that fails to
consider the characteristics of specific defendant and the specific
circumstances involved in the interrogation.
As a result,
comprehensive review of documentation surrounding the
interrogation/questioning process is essential for the assessment of
false-confession claims.199 Ideally, such a review should be based
on an evaluation of the complete/unedited video recording of the
police-suspect interaction.
The easiest way to enable such a judicial review is to
require police to record the entire interrogation.200 In fact, many
police agencies in the United States have embraced interrogation

199

See Saul M. Kassin & David Thompson, Videotaping All Police Interrogations, NY
TIMES (Aug. 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/01/opinion/police-interrogationsconfessions-record.html [https://perma.cc/JZ76-HMFS] (arguing that “Justice requires that
all police interrogations—the entire process, not just the final confession—should be
recorded on video.”) [emphasis added]. See also Vanoverbeke & Fukurai, supra note 188,
at 81–82 (discussing how the lay judge system in Japan helped create a window of
opportunity for requiring videotaping interrogations).
200 For critics of the lack of an electronic recording in the United States, see
Christopher Slobogin, Manipulation of Suspects and Unrecorded Questioning: After Fifty
Years of Miranda Jurisprudence, Still Two (or Maybe Three) Burning Issues, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 1157, 1189–90 (2017) (stating that “interrogation at the stationhouse may not be
recorded in full, and any softening up of the suspect prior to arrival at the stationhouse is
virtually never subject to recording”).
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recording so that they can always show later in court that the
confession was reliable and voluntary. 201
The major issue surrounding the proposal of videotaping the
entire interrogation is its implementation.
Recording is an
important step but should not be the end of the reform endeavor.
Studies surrounding false confessions vividly illustrate that what
goes on in the interrogation room should not remain undocumented,
unregulated, and unreviewed. Recording the entire police-suspect
interaction can bring interrogation practices into the sunlight. 202 It
can eventually facilitate the professionalization of police
interrogations and make judicial review possible and far more
effective.203
Now, I am aware that my proposal will be inherently
contradicted by the current functions of police intelligence network.
In fact, policing in Taiwan remains a largely local practice. The
police system operates twenty-four hours a day and is responsible
for crime prevention, detection and detention. Each police officer is
assigned to a local region and has to promptly react to any incidents
that occur in his/her jurisdiction, even when off-duty. Local police
often build close connections with the community. In Taiwan,
individual police patrolmen are assigned direct jurisdiction over
populations of individual families. Each local police station will
therefore be responsible for several police beats (勤區). The direct
supervising unit of the local police station is the police department
within each precinct of the city. Some of the investigators in the
police department keep their own beats and directly handle the cases
brought to them by the local police station. It is worth noting that
the local police station is a self-sustaining, community-based unit
201 See Thomas P. Sullivan, The Police Experience: Recording Custodial
Interrogations, CHAMPION, Dec. 2004, at 24, 27 (“Law enforcement personnel who oppose
recording custodial interviews speculate about hypothetical problems they have never
encountered because they haven’t given recordings a try. Those who have recorded for
years do not express similar misgivings. Experienced officers from all parts of the United
States support recording custodial interrogations in felony investigations from the time the
Miranda warnings are given until the suspect leaves the room.”); The Reid Technique Tips:
The
Value
of
Recording
Interrogations,
YOUTUBE
(Feb.
2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ODwicr_H7Pg&t=24s [https://perma.cc/3MKM-5V98]
(advising investigators to record their interviews and interrogations, as it “protect the
integrity of their work”).
202 Kassin et al., supra, note 7, at 25–27.
203 See also Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 953, 955 (emphasizing that “[a] videotape
unaccompanied by the existing Miranda system will make matters much worse, not better”).
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that undertakes various missions and tasks. Criminal investigation
is just one part of routine duty. However, since the local police
station is an integral element of the local community, people often
report crimes and disputes to the local police station instead of
going to the police department. Therefore, it is appropriate to state
that local police stations are the gateway to the Taiwanese criminal
justice process. Police officers in local stations will produce the
initial reports and forward all the materials to the police departments
within each precinct. It is the investigators in the police department
who then conduct further investigations. Police departments and
local police stations have joint responsibility to maintain local order
and reduce the crime rate. 204 Localized networks enhance police
officers’ abilities to gather information and (sometimes) to quickly
resolve conflicts. One of my interviewees shared his experience as
follows:
I was on a routine street patrol that day. I recognized
that that person was someone who had a long list of
previous drug offense convictions. I remembered
that I had arrested him several times. I decided to
approach him and have a chat. I demanded he stop,
basically treating him as a younger brother. I knew
him too well and I knew exactly what his weakness
was. I said: ‘Come! Come here! Are you still using
[drugs]? Come back to the station with me and have
a urine test.’ I acted as his “big brother” (老大). Of
course, I knew that I didn’t have the legal authority
to do so. But it was a command that he could not
reject. You have to understand that people who have
previous drug offense convictions are too willing to
betray their friends. Under-the-table negotiation is
very common. This guy promised to provide me
some useful hints in exchange for not arresting
him . . . .A good police officer should know the
potential criminals in his jurisdiction. Networking is
a crucial ability.205

204
205

See generally CAO ET AL., supra note 49.
Interview 11:22 (notes on file with the author).
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Moreover, Taiwan’s National Police Agency routinely
provides a list of quotas to assess officers’ individual and police
department’s collective performance. It is important for officers to
achieve their quotas and avoid being the under-performers that
reduce the evaluation of the whole department. Commanding
officers are held strictly accountable for the behaviors of all their
subordinates. Under the current performance evaluation mechanism,
a police department often maintains its own crime database and
local networks. Because police officers are competing with one
another, police departments often are unwilling to share information
with other agencies unless there is a joint operation. Therefore, one
feature of the Taiwanese police system is the information gap it
generates. It is not at all hard to imagine that most of police-suspect
interactions will not be captured by a camera.
One possible solution is to introduce the use of body-worn
cameras.206 Such a practice can demonstrate police commitment to
transparency, ensure accountability, and increase the public’s
trust. 207 Most patrol officers in large city police departments in
Taiwan are equipped with body-worn cameras and routinely record
police-citizen interactions. However, without a comprehensive
policy regulating the use of such cameras, the actual power of the
cameras to increase accountability will be limited. To begin with,
police do not have any legal obligation to document the recordings
and are allowed to watch them (and sometimes even to delete them).
Also, most of the investigators (偵查佐) in the police department do
not wear body cameras unless they have already decided to initiate
formal criminal justice proceedings. As one investigator described
to me:
A body-worn camera is generally used by uniformed
police officers. Its main purpose is to protect police
from unjustified complaints of misconduct and to
preserve
evidence
for
use
in
criminal
investigations . . . .We [investigators] are in plain
clothes, and we don’t usually carry body-worn
206

Slobogin, supra, note 200, at 1192–93 (arguing that the police body camera can
serve as a tool for ensuring that “any encounter before entering the stationhouse . . . is
accurately depicted at later proceedings”).
207 See Jacobi, supra note 6, at 53–55 (discussing concerns with regard to the use of
body cameras).
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cameras. We are equipped with the cameras when
we are involved in formal criminal proceedings.
Most of our investigative techniques, such as house
visits, intelligence gathering, or casual conversations
with potential suspects, will not be captured by the
body-worn cameras.208
In this sense, police have largely unchecked discretion in
deciding what types of interactions to record and, perhaps later, to
present in court. I suspect that most of the subtle interactions
between police and suspects still fall outside this domain. Police
possess the power to decide what counts as “formal” and what
counts as “informal” criminal justice proceedings. Along with this
power is the ability to separate the “backstage” from the “frontstage.” In brief, secrecy remains a key feature of Taiwanese police
actions.
Hoping that a single intervention could change such
practices is unrealistic. However, I do think that there are “baby
steps” that could help better manage the issue. First and foremost, a
general policy on the use of body-worn cameras needs to be
established. The policy should cover issues such as: (1) specifying
the categories of authorized and prohibited use of the equipment; (2)
training on the operation and documentation of the device; (3)
setting up the program administrator; (4) determining the conditions
of the terminations of recordings; (5) reviewing procedures of the
recordings; (6) storing and using the recordings; and (7) duplicating
and distributing the recordings. 209
Furthermore, even without the recordings of the entire police
interrogation process, experts on police matters should be allowed
208

Interview 10:23 (notes on file with the author).
In 2016, due to concerns about the potential for privacy intrusion, the National
Police Agency issued a three-page document of guidelines for the use of body-worn
cameras and data storage/sharing. The policy applies to every on-duty recording by police
officers, including the data recorded by a police officer’s privately-owned device. However,
police officers still enjoy broad discretion to decide when it is “necessary” under the new
guidelines to initiate recording (Article 3, Section 1). Moreover, with just a few exceptions,
data will only be preserved for one month (Article 4, Section 3). See Jingcha Jiguan Zhiqin
Shiyong Weixing Sheyingji ji Yingyin Ziliao Baocun Guanli Yaodian (警察機關執勤使用
微型攝影機及影音資料保存管理要點) [Guideline for the Use of Body Cameras and
Audiovisual Recording Data Management] (2016). For the use of police body cameras and
the implications as to a prosecutor’s duty of disclosure, see generally Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, Big Data Prosecution & Brady, 67 UCLA L. REV. 180 (2020).
209
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to testify about department-based practices.
Absent records
regarding specific cases, experts can still provide courts with useful
knowledge regarding the trainings and common practices within a
particular police department. Such testimony will be valuable for
the factfinder to decide whether the statements provided by a given
suspect are voluntary and reliable. Of course, my proposal will only
be feasible if researchers have enough access to police daily
activities. In the next section, I will demonstrate that proper
documentation of police activities and standardized/formalized
trainings need to be the cornerstone for any reforms to be successful.
D.

Changing the Police Culture

The functioning of modern policing is a complex social
phenomenon, in which the relationship between a variety of
completing interests and formal legal demands must be properly
managed. Controlling information is crucial in order to successfully
manage these relationships. The operation of the police institution
often relies on secrecy. 210 Secrecy in police work is not just hiding
the truth. It also includes the positive construction of subordinated
social relationships. 211 The backstage interrogation practices and
the underground Miranda system are essentially the production of
police secrecy. Backstage policing further facilitates a network of
police-suspect interactions, in which the rule of law cannot
effectively serve as the last word for regulating such social
relationships.212
See Yale Kamisa, Kauper’s “Judicial Examination of the Accused” Forty Years
Later—Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REV. 15, 32 (1974)
(indicating that the most unique feature of police interrogation is “its characteristic
secrecy”); RALPH, supra, note 111, at x-xi (stating that police torture in Chicago is an
“open secret” that “many people who work for the city of Chicago . . . have chosen to
remain silent about . . . because of this delicate tangle of connections”). See also Peter K.
Manning, The Police: Mandate, Strategies, and Appearance, in POLICING: A VIEW FROM
THE STREET 26–27 (Peter K. Manning & John Van Maanen eds., 1978) (“The use of
secrecy by the police is . . . a strategy employed not only to assist them in maintaining the
appearance of political neutrality but to protect themselves against public complaints.”).
211 See generally JEAN-PAUL BRODEUR, THE POLICING WEB 223–54 (2010)
(introducing the use of various relationships in policing).
212 For earlier empirical studies on backstage policing and the exercise of “low
visibility decisions” in the United States, see generally LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL.,
DETECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT (1967); LAFAVE, supra, note 143.
210
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But the backstage practices will not thrive if they cannot be
passed on to the next generation of police officers. The tricky
problem is that in order to maintain the secrecy of these backstage
practices, formal training cannot be relied on to reproduce them.
My research suggests that the police system in Taiwan has created
an elaborate informal mechanism that dominates current
interrogation practices. What emerges is a mentorship system. This
system generates greater incentives for police officers to follow than
the formal interrogation training system does. A high percentage of
interview practices are actually developed through the mentorship
system. In daily interrogation activities, police officers are
influenced by what appear to be common and long-followed
practices. Most of the newly recruited officers will be assigned a
senior officer (學長) as their master (師傅). They conduct daily
patrol, investigation, and other policing activities together. Junior
officers acquire practical techniques through close observations of
their seniors, and sometimes, through actual practices.
The reliance on the mentorship training system is one of the
main features of Taiwan’s police culture. 213 Police departments
work as close groups that gradually develop unwritten rules to
dictate an officer’s conduct in various circumstances. The world of
police interrogation practices is like a sophisticated game, an officer
needs to know all the rules in order to play properly.214 The police
213 Culture has long been seen as a persistent barrier to police reforms. Scholars have
described the role of culture in shaping police behaviors, perceptions, and attitudes. See,
e.g., WILLIAM K. MUIR, POLICE: STREETCORNER POLITICIANS 190 (1977) (arguing that a
successful policeman must be alert to the different responses his authority evokes and
describing four types of policeman); ELIZABETH REUSS-IANNI, TWO CULTURES OF POLICING:
STREET COPS & MANAGEMENT COPS 86 (1983) (discussing the situation in the New York
Police Department has wider implications for understanding of police behavior nationwide
and the theme in the “two cultures of policing”); JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE
BEHAVIOR 233 (1968) (discussing how to understand the concept of political culture and
how political culture affects police behaviors). See also Barbara E. Armacost,
Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 522–45 (2004)
(explaining how to structure legal remedies to address the organizational causes of police
brutality.); Julian A. Cook III, Police Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A Critique of
the President’s Task Force’s Final Report, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 106, 114
(2016) (concluding that an aggressive and unconstitutional police organizational culture
has been more pronounced in the U.S. since the Warren Court era).
214 See Bryant G. Garth & Joyce Sterling, Exploring Inequality in the Corporate Law
Firm Apprenticeship: Doing the Time, Finding the Love, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1361,
1367 (2009) (suggesting that legal field is a “semi-autonomous social space with its own
rules of the game . . . .Success in navigating the rules of the game relates to positions and
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system in Taiwan has developed norms and values that are
mandates peculiar to and appreciated only by its members in the
context of interrogation.
Mentorship training generates and
supports norms of internal solidarity. Senior police officers
substantively instruct new recruits with respect to interrogation
techniques. Many police officers I interviewed recalled that their
mentorship training had shaped their entire professional careers.
During my interviews with police officers, I focused on their
experiences regarding the mentorship training mechanism. All of
my interviewees shared their experiences as trainees and some of
the senior officers provided their approaches as trainers.
The heavy reliance on a mentorship system could indicate
that modern legal reforms in Taiwan might play only a marginal
role in police interrogation practices. Mentorship training works to
channel old practices and values into new blood. It essentially
keeps the police system stable and free from outside intervention.
Furthermore, mentorship training creates an environment in which
police may develop values and practices at odds with the rule of the
law. Therefore, the traditional police culture of truth seeking, the
reliance on personal relationships ( 關 係 ), and the insistence on
striking a proper balance between sentiment (情), reason (理), and
law (法), could continually remain the defining elements of police
interrogation practices. I submit that the mentorship mechanism
provides a sound explanation as to why these elements are
fundamentally integrated into my interviewees’ narratives of
interrogation and the Miranda warnings.
In sum, secrecy is a central element of current police
interrogation in Taiwan. Secret practices are built on a traditionally
well-functioning mentorship system. This system helps keep the
whole police system stable and basically free from outside scrutiny.
As a result, interrogation practices largely function without any
serious disturbance from the constant, and perhaps radical, changes
to the criminal justice system. 215 The distinct responsibilities and
dispositions of the players. A favorable position to play the game depends on advantages
that come from the possession of capital valued in the field . . . .Skill in playing the game
comes in part from dispositions toward certain kinds of behavior socialized into the
players—and that are rewarded in the field.”).
215 My empirical data shows that police agencies in Taiwan have successfully created a
loosely coupled system in which they are capable of making visible, public commitments
to satisfy external demands for reform while keeping these commitments as just myth and

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol17/iss1/2

2022]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

73

risks of law enforcement generate an internal police culture. Police
officers’ behaviors and attitudes toward the law coupled with their
large scope of job-discretion essentially form a unique police culture
that substantially affects the fulfillment of their institutionalized
duties and functions.216
Nevertheless, like every cultural system, police culture is
ever-changing. As ideals and ideology evolve and new ones emerge,
police culture is subject to transformation. 217 There are already
ceremony. By doing so, police are able to ensure that day-to-day, behind-the-scenes work
and culture were unaffected by those pronouncements. For discussions about
organizational decoupling and symbolic forms of compliance, see Lauren B. Edelman et al.,
The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J.
SOC. 406, 407, 410 (1999) (suggesting that organizations and professions strive to construct
rational responses to law); LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS,
AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS 31–41, 136–38 (2016) (arguing that the law regulating
companies are broad and ambiguous, and managers play a critical role in shaping what the
law means in daily practice); Lauren B. Edelman & Jessica Cabrera, Sex-Based
Harassment and Symbolic Compliance, 16 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 361, 372 (2020)
(concluding that many organizational policies prevent liability more than they prevent sexbased harassment and its reasons); John Hagan et al., Ceremonial Justice: Crime and
Punishment in a Loosely Coupled System, 58 SOCIAL FORCES 506, 506–52 (1979) (finding
that the involvement of probation officers in sentencing decisions is often ceremonial);
Linda Hamilton Krieger et al., When “Best Practices” Win, Employees Lose: Symbolic
Compliance and Judicial Inference in Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Cases, 40
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 843, 846 (2015) (discussing that when judges uncritically use the
presence of organizational structures to reason about whether discrimination occurred,
employers are much more likely to prevail); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan,
Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 340, 340–63 (1977) (discussing how institutional rules function);
Ashley T. Rubin, The Birth of the Penal Organization: Why Prisons Were Born to Fail, in
THE LEGAL PROCESS AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE: STUDIES INSPIRED BY THE WORK OF
MALCOLM FEELEY 163 (Rosann Greenspan et al., eds., 2019) (arguing that “[w]hile
organizations include a variety of formal structures like official, written rules and staff
hierarchies, they also develop extensive informal structures, which are more difficult to
observe and control”).
216 For general discussions about how personal values and beliefs affect police
behavior, see Eugene A. Paoline, Shedding Light on Police Culture: An Examination of
Officers’ Occupational Attitudes, 7 POLICE Q. 205, 205 (2004) (researching on police
culture and its association with a monolithic police culture); Eugene A. Paoline, Taking
Stock: Toward a Richer Understanding of Police Culture, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 199, 206 (2003)
(explaining police occupational culture and its causes, prescriptions and outcomes by
constructing a conceptual model).
217 Cultural change requires organizational members to give up long-held assumptions
and to adopt radically new ones. It is essentially a process of unlearning and relearning. It
is therefore unrealistic to expect that leaders of police agencies can change culture
immediately. Major cultural change involves forging new identities and perceptions, thus
generally necessitating a long—if not very long—time to achieve. Studies of
organizational culture have generally assumed that organizational cultures are created top-
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some indicators suggesting that police culture in Taiwan is at a
turning point. I surmise that today there is a new wave of officers
who are, once again, transforming police culture in Taiwan. A
leader of an investigation team frankly expressed his observations
and concerns to me:
Times are now very different. A lot of newly
recruited officers have a rather high degree of
education, and they don’t give much respect to senior
officers. They believe that everything they need can
be found through the Internet. For them, they do not
see the value of senior officers’ experience. Old
does not mean good, they [the junior officers] often
claim . . . .Nowadays, if you try to give them some
practical instruction, they may even rebuke you,
telling you that you have no authority to get involved
in their cases. Some might even directly tell you that
the old practices are illegal . . . .I think most senior
officers are just trying in good faith to help them. If
they do not want to listen, then we will probably stop
instructing them. For me, I have not served as a
mentor for many years. I am not going to share my
experiences with every junior officer. It really
depends on our predestined relationship (緣分).218
Similar comments can be seen in many of the narratives of
my interviewees. They believe that the new generations of officers
are rather too proud to consult with senior officers.219 Combined
with other negative incentives (such as peer competition, the risk of
down by leaders. This widespread notion has been that cultures reflect the values, beliefs,
and actions of organization’s leaders. See, e.g., EDGAR A. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL
CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 2, 317 (3rd ed. 1985) (describing the importance of
organizational culture); James N. Baron & Michael T. Hannan, Organizational Blueprints
for Success in High-tech Start-ups: Lessons from the Stanford Project on Emerging
Companies, 44 CAL. MANAGEMENT REV. 8 (2002) (analyzing which kind of human
resource management capable to endure and prosper and its reasons). However, empirical
evidence regarding the influence of organization’s leaders on culture formation and change
actually remains inconclusive. See, e.g., Benjamin Schneider et al., Organizational Climate
and Culture, 64 ANN. REV. PSYChol. 361, 372 (2013) (suggesting that empirical studies
supporting the role of leaders in organizational culture are difficult to find).
218 Interview 30:27 (notes on file with the author).
219 Fieldnote 35:09 (notes on file with the author).
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being involved in illegal interrogation practices, and the perceived
waste of personal time) few officers now are willing to work to train
closely as mentor-mentee with other officers. Not to mention that
mentorship means teaching everything you know to your potential
competitor. The old officers’ attitudes toward the mentorship
system can be summed up in the pithy aphorism: “Doing more,
more trouble; doing nothing, no problem.” Moreover, a leader of a
City’s Police Department wants to take a further, overt step and
reform the tradition of the mentorship practices. During the
interview, he told me:
We do not have systemic training. For such a long
period, police in Taiwan were trained through the
mentorship system. I personally think we need to
enhance the training regarding interrogation. We
should refer to the training in other countries,
especially the Reid Method that is used in the United
States, or other training techniques . . . .Why did I
say we do not have interrogation training? Well,
maybe we do. But it is limited to informing officers
about the format of the interrogation record and the
basic procedural requirements . . . .In terms of how to
interact with the suspect or what techniques to use . . .
these are totally neglected aspects of our current
training system . . . .Police officers usually learn
from doing. I think such a system completely lacks
efficiency.220
My ideal model is to systematically incorporate
training techniques from other countries.
Our
training can be modeled on the Reid Method, the
training in the U.K., or trainings in other countries.
The core idea is to have a standardized procedure and
encourage all the police officers to follow it. 221
The commander went on to criticize the current mentorship
system:
220
221

Interview 32:14 (notes on file with the author).
Interview 32:27 (notes on file with the author).
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Criminal investigation in Taiwan is largely based on
the mentorship system.
Senior officers take
responsibility to teach junior officers (學弟). I was
trained through such a system. It is really ineffective.
First of all, not all the senior officers have
substantive experience. It is fine if you are lucky
enough to meet a good mentor. But things can go
really wrong if you are taught the wrong techniques
or improper practices. Also, even if your mentor is
well experienced, nobody can guarantee that he will
teach you everything or be able to covey his
experience clearly . . . it is time to change the current
training regime into a systematized one. 222
Whether old Taiwanese practices will continue to thrive in
the future remains to be seen. However, one thing is certain: Taiwan
needs to survey the best practices of police interview and
interrogation in different criminal justice systems. Given the dark
history of past practices and the risk to suspects’ dignity in the
interrogation room, one should be especially disconcerted by
techniques that can lead innocent people to incriminate themselves.

V.

A TALE OF TWO MIRANDA FAILURES

The U.S.-oriented Miranda mechanism can probably only
function in “a truly adversarial criminal justice system and
culture.”223 Despite the strong U.S. influence on Taiwan’s Code of
Criminal Procedure over the past decades, few have argued that the
Taiwanese criminal justice system is truly adversarial.224 In practice,
222

Interview 32:33 (notes on file with the author).
Richard A. Leo, Miranda, Confessions, and Justice: Lessons for Japan?, in THE
JAPANESE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM IN CONTEXT 212 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa
eds., 2002). But see ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW 79, 80 (2003) (suggesting that adversarial legalism only offers limited protections to
the defendant and those protections are often overly complicated for legal actors to
comprehend and apply).
224 In a series of reforms since 2002, criminal trials in Taiwan began to take steps from
a non-adversarial system toward a more adversarial one. Prior to 2002, the prosecutor
would simply read the opining statement word for word, and the defense attorney had little
if any role to play during trial proceedings. The revisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure reiterated that the burden of proof should be on the prosecution, not on the judge.
By design, the judge is expected to play a much more neutral, passive role. See generally
223
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implementing Miranda is exceedingly difficult in Taiwan, and
perhaps in many other jurisdictions also, because it conflicts with
the broader societal and legal culture. Nevertheless, I believe that
the failure of Miranda in Taiwan and the United States offers an
opportunity for worthwhile reflection on Miranda jurisprudence. In
fact, the comparative angle adopted in this Article may well offer a
valuable cautionary tale for other legal systems that have
implemented or are contemplating implementing mechanisms
similar to the U.S. Miranda rule.
The fate of implementing Miranda-like mechanism may
have been determined by its origin. The Miranda decision was not
based on a comprehensive understanding of police activities and the
profound discretion that police are able to exercise. Instead, the
Warren Court in 1966 relied on police training manuals as a proxy
for actual empirical studies to describe the techniques and methods
of police interrogation, and more broadly, police activities. 225 In
fact, studies of the role of discretion in the criminal justice system
were only in their infancy in 1965 following the publication of a
groundbreaking book series from the American Bar Foundation
(ABF)’s Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in which
police discretion was finally put under the spotlight. 226 The ABF
survey study employed an ethnographic approach by sending field
observers to report on the problems encountered, the actions

Brian L. Kennedy & Chun-Ling Shen, The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Criminal
Law Reform in Taiwan, AM. J. CHINESE STUDIES 107, 115–18 (2005); Margaret L. Lewis,
Taiwan’s New Adversarial System and the Overlooked Challenge of Efficiency-Driven
Reforms, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 651, 662–79 (2009).
225 See Coughlin, supra note 116, at 1635; Ferguson & Leo, supra note 7, at 942.
226 See generally supra note 115. For other studies around this time period, see
generally FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A
CRIME (1969); DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); ROBERT O. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO
TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE (1969). For earlier scholarly publications on
techniques and methods on police interrogation, see, e.g., Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Police
Practices and the Law—From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 11, 11–55
(1962); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: LoVisibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 543–94 (1960);
Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75
HARV. L. REV. 904, 904–31 (1962); Wayne R. LaFave & Frank J. Remington, Controlling
the Police: The Judge’s Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, MICH.
L. REV. 987, 987–1012 (1965).
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taken, 227 and the considerations involved in making discretionary
decisions in law enforcement. 228 For the first time, the ABF
research focused on the discretionary decisions of all participants—
including police, prosecutors, judges, and probation and parole
officers—in the criminal justice system. The survey cleared up a
number of misunderstandings concerning the role of the police. 229
227 For the development and operation of research methods in the study, see JAMES D.
TURNER, THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: PILOT
PROJECT REPORT VOLUME I, SECTION E. 1–58 (1958) (presenting the history and objectives
of the project).
228 See ARTHUR H. SHERRY ET AL., THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL J USTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES: PLAN FOR A SURVEY TO BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION (1955) (explaining that an initial product of the decision to
initiate a survey was a detailed plan that described the design of the study and early
sponsorship). Interestingly, Fred E. Inbau, one of the co-authors of the police training
manual—Criminal Interrogation and Confession (1962)—was actually one of the early
consultants on the ABF project. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, SURVEY OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY AND STATUS
REPORT (1959) (archives on file with the author). Inbau was the author of two pilot project
reports, addressing topics such as “on the street” police detention, frisking, and questioning
of suspected persons; arrest, search and seizure; and other police activities; see THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: PILOT PROJECT REPORT
VOLUME VII (1958).
229 The original field reports of the ABF study documented multiple interrogation
practices. See, e.g., ABF Field Report 10031, 10061; 10076; 10171; 10234; 10271
(archives on file with the author). For instance, during the interrogation of one seventeenyear-old male, the field report documented that the defendant “sat with his head down and
appeared to ignore the questioning of the detective. The detective then raised his voice to
the defendant and asked ‘Am I boring you?’ He then instructed the defendant: ‘Sit up and
speak to me. I can talk to you just as easily next Sunday as I can now.’ The detective stated:
‘I will hold you for several days so that you may cool off in jail.’ The defendant
straightened up somewhat and, in answer to the questions shot at him by the detective,
indicated that he was involved in a fight with a fellow . . . .The defendant still did not admit
to breaking the glass. The detective said ‘Maybe you need about thirty days to straighten
you out. What the hell good are you? You don’t want a job and you don’t earn a living.
Why don’t you go back to school?’ There was no response from the defendant. The
detective then asked ‘How did the glass get broken?’ The defendant said, ‘I know I did it,
but I don’t know how.’ Breaking the defendant down further, the detective said ‘You are
no damn good to anybody. You keep this up and you will be doing time . . . in a matter of
months.’ The detective then reviewed the previous arrests of this defendant with
him . . . .Apparently, the detective was satisfied with the fact that he had obtained an
admission from this fellow, and had him returned to his cell.” ABF Field Report 11084
(archives on file with the author). See also O. W. WILSON, POLICE TREATMENT OF SUSPECT
DURING DETENTION PRIOR TO RELEASE OR INITIAL APPEARANCE IN COURT 41–61 (1957)
(documenting police interrogation practices during the investigation of multiple types of
crimes). The ABF field studies in Wisconsin additionally found that, although there were
no indications of actual or threatened physical mistreatment in the questioning of suspects
by police, the field representatives concluded that the practices reflected a low level of
training and unfamiliarity with legal rules. An example was the use of interrogation in
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For instance, Wayne LaFave’s (1965) study, which was based on
the ABF survey, revealed that policing was more about
peacekeeping than crime control and that police officers appeared to
be guided by anything but legal guidelines and organizational
controls.230 Based on their findings of the prevalence of discretion
in policing, many researchers “were struck less by the illegality of

investigating a person who was suspected of having shot another. During questioning, the
suspect said that his gun had been stolen but contradicted himself about the circumstances
under which it had been taken. The detective told the suspect that he had witnesses who
would testify that the suspect was present when the victim was shot, but the suspect then
said that he would talk no more until he saw his attorney and the detective took him back
to his cell. Still, the detective interviewed the suspect again for one-half hour on the same
day. There is no reference in the field representative’s account of the interrogation of the
suspect that the suspect had been advised of his constitutional rights including the fact that
his statements to the police might be used against him. Nevertheless, the fieldnotes did
show that the field representative had watched three other interrogations and that, in each
instance, the detective informed the suspect of his rights in such a manner that “I have no
doubt that the detective has done it many times [emphasis added].” ABF Field Report
10520:14; 10527:03 (archives on file with the author). Another field representative, who
asked a Kansas highway patrolman whether he was required to advise suspects of their
constitutional rights, was told by the patrolman: “A [recent] ruling from the attorney
general’s office, directed to the highway patrol, stated that in this state we are not required
to advise a man of his rights before he gives [a] statement. However, in order to save time
and trouble, I’m sure you will find that the uniform practice is for the patrolman to do so.”
Id. at 10390.3 (archive on file with the author). For an overview of contemporary police
interrogation trainings, see Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 1529–35.
230 LAFAVE, supra note 143, at 61–82. For other pre-Miranda era police interrogation
practices, see TIFFANY ET AL., supra note 212, at 6–94 (discussing the goals and process of
“field interrogation” conducted by police). Field interrogation is a practice which
commonly involves confrontation between the police and the minority groups residing in
high-crime areas. In many circumstances, it may be difficult to distinguish a field
interrogation from crime-preventive street practices which have an objective other than
arrest and prosecution of suspects. Moreover, the ABF study found that police did not, in
conducting field interrogation, provide warnings to the person about their right not to
answer. See ABF Field Report 10258; 10286; 10290; 10291 (archives on file with the
author) (discussing the practice of field interrogation and the police’s lack of notifying
certain rights during a field interrogation). The authors of the ABF study concluded that
“the success of a field interrogation program must depend not on a feeling of social or
moral obligation to respond to questioning but on a fear of the legal and practical
consequences of contumacy”. See TIFFANY ET AL., supra note 212, at 67. See also
Lawrence P. Tiffany, Field Interrogation: Administrative, Judicial and Legislative
Approaches, 43 DENV. L.J. 389, 391–92 (1966) (discussing whether Miranda rule applies
to field interrogation); STUDIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
WISCONSIN: A REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE PILOT PROJECT PHASE OF
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT 55–57 (Arthur H. Sherry et al., eds., 1956) (documenting
the functions of field interrogation reports).
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so much police behavior than by the sheer fact that so much
decision making had so little relationship to law on the books.”231
With this background in mind, it is perhaps not surprising
that even after decades of development of Miranda jurisprudence in
the U.S., Miranda has not changed police officers’ basic approaches
to interrogation, nor has it been effective in reducing incidents of
false confessions. 232 Police are confronted with a variety of
important social and political problems which are dealt with by
means other than the formal processes of the criminal justice system.
The effort to eliminate or reduce discretion at one stage in the
process where it is visible, such as the warning or waiver of
Miranda, will create a risk that discretion will merely shift to
another stage where its exercise is less visible, such as during preinterrogation interaction and post-waiver interrogation.233
My proposed agenda in this Article is based on the
understanding that the Miranda rule should never be expected to
serve as a principal tool to eliminate or at least “tame” police
discretion during interrogation. The “failure” of Miranda in Taiwan
and the United States, and perhaps in many other jurisdictions, is
built on our wishful thinking that the complete elimination of police
discretion is possible and desirable. I believe it is time to set
Miranda free from such shackles. However, the idea of leaving
Miranda behind and moving ahead seems to be a costly and
unpredictable strategy for the United States.
The Miranda
jurisprudence has been widely litigated and quite well developed.
After the Court’s decision in Dickerson, it was clear that Miranda,
being a constitutional decision, could not be effectively overruled

231

Samuel Walker, Origins of the Contemporary Criminal Justice Paradigm: The
American Bar Foundation Survey, 1953–1969, 9 JUST. Q. 47, 68 (1992).
232 See LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 7, at 123–32, 280–81 (stating that the
“scholarly consensus is that Miranda’s impact in the real world is, for the most part,
negligible” and that “once a suspect has waived his rights, Miranda does not restrict
deceptive, suggestive, or manipulative interrogation techniques’ hostile or overbearing
questioning styles; lengthy confinement; or any of the “inherently compelling” conditions
of modern accusatorial interrogation that may lead a suspect to confess”). See also Richard
A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 259, 260–61 (1996) (arguing that contemporary police interrogation “bears many of
the essential hallmarks of a confidence game”); Thomas, supra note 13, at 1999
(suggesting that “Miranda has not changed very much about police interrogation.”).
233 See LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 7, at 281.
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by legislation passed by the U.S. Congress. 234 Under such
circumstances, there is little if any support among scholars and the
American legal community generally to argue for overruling
Miranda.235
In contrast, Taiwan’s Miranda mechanism was originally
established by the legislature. 236 Even though the Taiwanese
Congress gradually added new elements to the protections, many of
the critical aspects of Miranda, particularly the duty of police to
cease questioning if a suspect asserts the right to remain silent, have
never taken root in Taiwan. While Miranda has a significant
presence in Taiwanese popular culture, 237 it has an insignificant
presence in the formal domain of the law. 238 It is in fact very
234 See generally Pizzi & Hoffman, supra note 154, at 823–24; Weisselberg, In the
Stationhouse, supra note 5.
235 Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops: A Review of Fifty
Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 685, 827–28 (2017) (citing the original language of the Miranda decision, some
scholars argued that “while the Court’s later decision in Dickerson gave a narrow reading
of this language, it certainly did not retreat from the proposition that Miranda could be
replaced by other alternatives”). However, no state attorney general supported the U.S.
Department of Justice’s position that Miranda does not unduly impede law enforcement
and it is easier to administer than other alternative mechanisms, see Bruce A. Green,
Gideon’s Amici: Why Do Prosecutors So Rarely Defend the Rights of the Accused?, Yale
L.J., 2336, 2350 (2013). See also Kamisa, supra note 210, at 23 (revisiting Paul Kauper’s
proposal for magisterial interrogation and suggesting that a judicially supervised
interrogation “would present an attractive alternative to the Miranda model”).
236 Kennedy & Shen, supra note 224, at 119 (arguing that Taiwan’s Miranda rule is
one of the many American legal “buzz words” adopted by the legislature to “give their
reforms some veneer of being a big change”).
237 Some police departments in Taiwan routinely upload excerpts of body camera
footage to social media. These records often vividly capture the moment of the Miranda
warnings. For instance, see Kaohsiung Police, FACEBOOK (November 4, 2021),
https://www.facebook.com/KaohsiungPolice/videos/
[https://perma.cc/6HJD-SHKS]
(providing various video clips of law enforcement activities); SET News, Qiang Jincha
Xuandu Quanli Chao Liuli Xianfan Tingwan Shayan (強！警察宣讀權利超流利 嫌犯聽
完傻眼) [Superb! The Police Read the Rights Super Fluently, The Suspect Dumbfounded
After
Listening],
YOUTUBE
(June
27,
2016)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=atKf48CsZJw
[https://perma.cc/8V3G-X4Y2]
(showing unique style of how a police officer provided the Miranda warnings,). Also,
many Taiwanese TV crime/detective series have hired veteran police officers as
consultants. These officers often serve as interpreters of legal language and mediators of
legal knowledge. And, indeed, as one of the lawmakers proposing the introduction of the
Miranda rule in Taiwan stated, the Taiwanese people have long been exposed to “the spirit
of Miranda” through American TV dramas and movies, see LI FA YUAN GONG BAO (立法
院公報) [THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE], Vol. 86, No. 52, at 192 (1997).
238 In fact, the Taiwanese media often describe suspects who exercise their right to
silence as individuals who “use their legal knowledge to game the system” (知法玩法).
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unlikely for a court in Taiwan to ever find a Miranda violation. As
I have demonstrated, exercising one’s Miranda rights is extremely
demanding.
The central argument of this Article is that it is time for
policy makers in both Taiwan and the United States to prioritize
other protections against false confessions and to better manage
police interrogations. Miranda has almost become an obstacle for
any potential reform proposals in the United States. But it need not
be so. The failure of Miranda in Taiwan to date is certainly not
something to be celebrated. Nevertheless, Taiwan offers an
example for other systems to rethink the development of their
Miranda jurisprudence.
I believe managing police interrogation is possible. But it is
not through the Miranda rule. Instead, my proposed solution is to
increase the visibility of police discretionary practices.
Discretionary practices are likely to survive after they become
publicly visible only if the practices achieve objectives that have
public support. Also, visibility may eventually lead to formality and
cultural change. In other words, my three main proposals—using
expert testimony, videotaping the entire police-suspect interaction,
and changing police culture—increase the visibility of police
interrogation activities and may result in “organic control” of police
discretion. In brief, echoing the wisdom of the ABF survey more
than sixty years ago, I argue that it is naïve to think that police
interrogation can operate sensibly by the Miranda rule alone
without the exercise of discretionary judgment. Instead of relying
on the Miranda rule to reduce or eliminate police discretion, I
believe the better approach is to design a system where “good
judgment” can be encouraged. Increasing the visibility of police
activities is the critical first step.
See, e.g., Yang Zheng-Yu (羊正鈺), Ma Ying-Jeou Yin San Zhong An Zaici Yingxun Weihe
Quancheng Si Xiaoshi Dou Xingshi Jianmoquan (馬英九因「三中案」再次應訊，為何
全程 4 小時都行使「緘默權」？ ) [Ma Ying-Jeou Responded to the Hearing Again
Because of the “San Zhong An”, Why Did He Exercise His “Right to Silence” for the
Entire
Four
Hours?],
THE
NEWS
LENS,
(April
26,
2018)
https://www.thenewslens.com/article/94345 [https://perma.cc/3FZ8-W5EL] (involving the
Former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-Jeou); Xiao Bo-Wen (蕭博文), Chen Yu-Zhen
Xingshi Jianmoquan Chahui Zhuangqiang (陳玉珍行使緘默權 查賄撞牆) [Chen Yu-Zhen
Exercises Rights to Remain Silent in Anti-Corruption Case], CHINATIMES, (December 14,
2012 1:17AM) https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20121214000840-260106?chdtv
[https://perma.cc/CC95-VYBM] (involving the former prosecutor Chen Yu-Zhen).
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Before we can finally move forward to the future of
Miranda, it is necessary to clarify and respond to two conventional
propositions regarding Miranda rule:
Proposition one: Miranda should be abolished due to its
harmful effects on crime clearance rates and, very possibly, on
confession and conviction rates. 239
Proposition two: Miranda should not be abandoned since it
provides a bright-line rule that imposes restraints on the police. 240
Proposition one suggests that the implementation of the
Miranda mechanism had a major adverse effect on the willingness
of suspects to respond to police questioning. However, it is crucial
to note that no empirical measure can capture the value of dignity
and the respect for individual autonomy. We cannot properly and
empirically measure the value of respect for individual autonomy or
the value of constructing an adversarial criminal justice system.
Without definitive knowledge of Miranda’s empirical effect, some
scholars resort to arguments about the symbolic value of treating
everyone equally and the value of having additional assurance that
confessions are voluntary and intelligent. 241 In this sense, a
cost/benefit analysis is utterly unsuited to the task.
Meanwhile, some empirical studies regarding the impact of
Miranda are based on the assumption that we need to choose
between the protection of dignity and autonomy and the
239

See generally supra note 6.
A great value of the initial Miranda decision is its simplicity. See, e.g., J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 285 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[W]ith [Miranda’s]
rigidity comes increased clarity. Miranda provides a ‘workable rule to guide police
officers . . . .’” See also Leo & White, supra note 8, at 465, 471–72 (suggesting that “the
restraints Miranda does impose on the police are important ones”); Schulhofer, supra note
12, at 561–62 (arguing that “Miranda’s stated objective was not to eliminate confessions,
but to eliminate compelling pressure in the interrogation process” and that Miranda marks
a critical leap forward to substitute psychological manipulation for physical coercion). But
see RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 856–59 (3d ed. 2011)
(discuss whether to preserve Miranda on the ground that it has little effect); Jacobi, supra
note 6, at 56–64 (criticizing the per se rule of Miranda and proposing a variable standard
for reforming Miranda).
241 PITMAN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 10, at 155–72; See Weisselberg, supra note 9,
at 170–71(“A cost/benefit analysis is utterly unsuited to the task, for there is no single
metric that can encompass Miranda’s costs and its benefits.”).
240
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maintenance of social order. 242 That is to say, we cannot expect our
legal system to implement safeguards without having, at least, a
deleterious effect on law enforcement efforts. As with any rules
that provide fundamental protections to suspects, law enforcement
activities will always incur costs.
Based on such a rationale, legal scholars put different
emphasis on the balance sheet. Some argue that the costs are too
substantial and thus outweigh the Miranda warnings’ proposed
protections.243 Others say that we should tolerate the costs because
doing so ensures that the legal system remains a fair process for the
accused, in accord with its adversarial structure. 244 And, as a fair
process, such a system provides people with confidence in cases’
ultimate just outcomes. 245 No matter what, when starting with the
presumption that legal protections for suspects will inhibit police
action, we ultimately must determine the relative importance of
these contradicting values in light of our own preferences, beliefs,
and, perhaps, legal cultures. 246
As for Proposition two: the danger of such a proposition is
that it further suggests Miranda functions as a replacement for the
due process test. Under such a rationale, Miranda protection
becomes the substitute for the voluntariness test. With the brightline rule of Miranda, courts often are reluctant to apply due process
scrutiny after determining that a Miranda waiver was valid. If
warnings were delivered by the police and a waiver was given or
signed, it becomes difficult to persuade a judge that a confession is

242

See generally supra note 6.
See STUNTZ, supra note 6, at 222–25 (arguing that Miranda does not achieve
equality); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 780, 832–36 (2006) (arguing that Miranda is the wrong conduct rule because it favors
sophisticated suspects); William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975–98
(2001) (“Miranda imposes only the slightest of costs on the police, and its existence may
well forestall more serious, and more successful, regulation of police questioning.”).
244
See Weisselberg, supra note 9, at 170–72 (“We tolerate those costs because doing
so ensures that our legal processes rest on long-standing principles instead of everchanging balance sheets.”).
245 MARY L. PITMAN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, T HE MIRANDA RULING: ITS PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 15–21 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
246 For a methodological reflection on comparing legal cultures, see generally
Jacqueline Hodgson, Comparing Legal Cultures: The Comparativist as Participant
Observer, in CONTRASTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE 139 (David
Nelken ed., 2000).
243

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol17/iss1/2

2022]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

85

involuntary. 247 The warning/waiver helps judges deny the
defendant’s motion to suppress the subsequent statement. In short,
Miranda has practically displaced the court’s voluntariness scrutiny.
However, due process rights exist independently of Miranda. The
Court never talks about developing a mechanism that will replace
the due process test. Miranda has never been designed to cure the
limitation of the case-by-case approach mandated by the due
process test. We have placed and continue to place too much hope
on Miranda—and blame it after the warning system fails to meet
our unrealistic expectations. Miranda has been overloaded and it is
time to revitalize due process jurisprudence and other more effective
protections suggested in this Article.
Once we have at least refuted the above two assertions, the
door is open for future reforms on police interrogation. Compared
to the U.S. Miranda system, Taiwan has developed a much weaker
version in which police are required to deliver the warnings to
suspects but do not advise suspects that they can immediately
terminate interrogation. 248 Whether such a weak version of
Miranda is preferable is open for further debate. 249 But regardless
of the nature of a Miranda system a country has developed, it is
simply unrealistic to put all of our faith in Miranda, hoping that a
single warning system can prevent false confession. With the help
of well-established social science and clinical studies regarding
false confession, and a better system of video recording for the
entire police interrogation process, perhaps it can at least be time,
after its fiftieth anniversary, to treat Miranda as a ritual and
247 See Charles Weisselberg & Stephanos Bibas, Debate, The Right to Remain Silent,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 80 (2010) (“Miranda, in essence, has become a substitute for
serious voluntariness scrutiny.”); Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 1595 (arguing that judges
would automatically assume voluntary confession when Miranda warnings were given);
George C. Thomas III, The End of the Road for Miranda v. Arizona: On the History and
the Future of the Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 18 (2000)
(“Judges seem to assume that once a suspect knows his rights and chooses to talk to the
police, any subsequent statement must be voluntary.”).
248
Moreover, a statement obtained in violation of Miranda rule does not have to be
excluded unless the police acted in bad faith or the statement was involuntary. See supra
note 29.
249 Although Taiwan was not specifically mentioned, Cassell and Fowles proposed a
modified version of Miranda that essentially emulates the actual practices in Taiwan. See
Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops: A Review of Fifty Years of
Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REV.
685, 828–38 (2017) (explaining that Miranda warnings have little effect on confession
rates).
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symbolic procedure and place greater emphasis on other more
effective mechanisms.
I am not trying to deny the impact Miranda has bought to
the criminal justice system. Miranda has civilized police activities
and has increased public awareness of criminal suspects’
constitutional rights. 250 It demonstrates that the police are: first,
benevolent and caring; second, concerned about the suspect’s
situation, concerns, and needs; third, considering the suspect’s
willingness to terminate the interrogation; and fourth, trying to be
fair and neutral. Miranda also provides dignified treatment to the
suspect; it shows that the police officer takes the rights and status of
the suspect seriously. Most importantly, dignified and respectful
treatment is something that the police can easily provide to
everyone with whom they deal.
Did Miranda hamstring the police? Did it make crime
control more difficult? Did it tie the hands of the police and coddle
criminals, at the expense of victims and the public? For policy
makers and police interrogation researchers, it is important to bear
in mind that the Miranda warnings should not be seen as the
flowery opening of a “legal drama.” The appearance of Miranda
legislation represents a government’s commitment to democracy
and respect for a suspect’s dignity and autonomy. What is the
practical impact of Miranda on the criminal justice system? After
decades of endeavor, I think the answer is still murky and needs
further, more comprehensive, empirical study. However, one thing
250 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 8, at 407 (suggesting that Miranda “remind[ed] the
officer of the law that however miserable the one who stood before him, however savage
the crime of which he was accused, he was still a man, possessed of all the attributes,
including the constitutional rights, of other men”); Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect
the Innocent or the Guilty, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 551, 558–60 (2007) (“The warnings implicitly
suggest to the suspect that the police are respectful of the suspect’s rights, that the police
are not only law-abiding, but that they are also fair and objective.”); Kassin et al., supra
note 7, at 7; Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, supra note 7, at 668 (“Miranda has
exercised a civilizing influence on police interrogation behavior, and in so doing has
professionalized police practices.”); Leo & White, supra note 8, at 466 (“The abolition of
Miranda’s warning and waiver requirements would send the symbolic message to police
that their interrogation practices would be less scrutinized by the courts and, therefore,
their latitude to exert pressure on reluctant suspects to confess would be greater.”);
Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 562 (stating that Miranda’s symbolic effects are not
irrelevant as they “help shape the self-conception and define the role of conscientious
police professionals . . . [and] underscore our constitutional commitment to restraint in an
area in which emotions easily run uncontrolled”).
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is for sure, the future of Miranda lies in the way we judge the value
of procedural fairness and our continued insistence on it.

CONCLUSION
This Article has examined critically the functioning of the
Miranda rule within Taiwan’s criminal justice system. I have
demonstrated how Taiwan has translated the American Miranda
system into its own legal culture and criminal justice system. I have
argued that the Miranda protection is a failed mechanism in both
Taiwan and the United States, although for quite different reasons.
Over the years, Taiwanese reformers have unsuccessfully advocated
for implementation of genuine Miranda-like protections. The
current Miranda mechanism clearly fails to serve as an adequate
safeguard against police abuse in Taiwan. Empirical evidence
shows that Miranda does very little to protect individuals from
coercive interrogation and false confession. The people of Taiwan
will not fully enjoy their Miranda rights until we can place the
current underground police interrogation practices in the sunshine.
The use of deceptive interrogation techniques not only is completely
obscured from judicial scrutiny, but it also poses ethical dilemmas
in a modern democratic society that is supposed to be committed to
the values of both crime control and due process of law.
This Article makes some suggestions for reforming the
“failed” Miranda system—by not reforming it. First, expert
testimony regarding interrogation and confession should be
introduced into the criminal justice system. Expert testimony may
reduce the number of police-induced false confessions that cause
wrongful convictions. As scholars in the United States argue, the
use of social science expert testimony at pretrial suppression
hearings makes judges more likely to exclude questionable
confessions from evidence. 251 Therefore, it results in the admission
of fewer police-induced false confessions into evidence at trial,
which in turn results in fewer wrongful convictions.
251 See Brain Cutler et al., Expert Testimony on Interrogation and False Confession,
82 UMKC L. REV. 589, 591 (2014) (arguing that “expert testimony on false confessions
has a more solid research base, and is at least as reliable, if not more so, than other types of
social science evidence that courts routinely admit”); LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION, supra
note 7, at 314–16 (explaining courts often exclude false confessions when the use of social
science expert testimony is present).
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A confession is a powerful piece of evidence. 252 Social
science expert testimony can aid the factfinder by discussing the
scientific research literature documenting the phenomenon of
police-induced false confessions. 253 Experts can helpfully and
credibly explain how and why particular interrogation methods and
strategies can cause the innocent to confess. Moreover, experts can
identify the conditions that increase the risk of false confessions.
By educating the factfinder about the existence, psychology, and
cause of police-induced false confessions, social science expert
testimony at trial can reduce the number of confession-based
wrongful convictions. Finally, expert testimony may indirectly
change the behavior of police and prosecutors. By exposing flaws,
social science expert testimony may deter misbehavior and
eventually improve law enforcement agencies’ screening practices.
Its use should lead eventually to a decline in the reliance on
psychologically coercive interrogation methods and a reduction in
the number of false confessions. With the introduction of expert
testimony, fewer innocent people will be wrongfully convicted in
Taiwan because of false confessions.
Yet in practice confessions frequently constitute powerful
incriminating evidence to determine guilt, and deceptive
interrogation techniques can often seem to be a necessary evil.
While physical coercion during interrogation is repugnant to most
people, there is little shared consensus in Taiwan or elsewhere about
where to draw the line between “permissible” and “impermissible”
deceptive tactics. Moreover, the mere comprehension of the right to
remain silent and the right to request defense counsel is insufficient
to dispel the coercion inherent in the interrogation room. Several
other mechanisms of the criminal justice system ought to be taken
252

Blandon-Gitlin et al., supra note 172, at 1; Kassin, supra note 172, at 249; Ofshe &
Leo, supra note 170, at 193; SIMON, supra note 182, at 160–62. A defense expressed to me,
“I often asked my client why they appointed me in such a late stage when the case was
already in front of the court or when they have already been severely sentenced by district
courts? The most common answer is that they mistakenly trust the investigator and waive
their right to have a legal counsel presented during interrogation . . . .I can hardly imagine
just how many suspects abandon such a life-saving protection of having a lawyer based
merely on the instructions of police officers . . . my clients sometime complained to me
that why I did not defense their innocence in court. The reality is, when clients confessed
during police or prosecutor’s investigation, it became fruitless to argue their innocence in
court.” Interview 43:08 (notes on file with the author).
253 See, e.g., Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 127, at
472–91 (discussing various consequences of false confessions).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol17/iss1/2

2022]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

89

into consideration instead, including: (one) the abuse of pretrial
custody; (two) the function of defense lawyers during police
interrogations; and (three) the unique two-step police/prosecutor
interrogation structure. I have speculated here that the originally
envisioned Miranda protections are largely compromised by these
other legal practices in Taiwan. Taiwanese attorneys have also
suggested to me that defense lawyers often perceive that their
clients may be harmed by asserting the right to silence, such as
through longer periods of pre-charge detention; therefore, lawyers
may be hesitant to advise their clients to remain silent. 254 If police
officers and prosecutors continually use pretrial custody as a
“legalized threat” to secure confessions, if suspects do not receive
efficient and sufficient guidance from defense lawyers, and if
prosecutors function merely as rubber stamps approving what has
been said or done during police interrogation, then the Miranda
protections are and will remain nothing but empty promises in
Taiwan. In the worst-case scenario, innocent people will continue
to falsely confess and be punished.

254

See, e.g., TAIPEI BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 124, at 117–18 (recommending
defense counsel inform their clients of the risk of remaining silent during interrogation).
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